> They were often not the building owner but a lessor on their own, taking long-term leases and subleasing in pieces with little or no commitment.

I put that as the CEO self dealing. He purchased buildings and rented them out to WeWork. Had WeWork purchased the buildings themselves, the model would have been on far firmer footing. Again, I agree there was too much glamorous spending and living in the limelight, but landlords can obviously turn a profit if they keep the expenses reasonable.

The same business model weakness would exist -- in a recession, short term renters will stop showing up.

While they'd avoid having to pay rent in empty units, they'd still not any leases

Sorry, what's your evidence that the bulk of WeWork's leases were with Neumann? My understanding is that they were leasing from many building owners, something the article supports.

I never said it was the majority? It was just an example of grift. The only correct number of buildings a company should be leasing from the CEO is zero. In a similar vein, the company should not be leasing the We branding from the CEO.

WeWork was not operated in a way to succeed. I am only taking issue with the notion that the core business model (renting real estate) is flawed. Had there been a willingness for modest, organic expansion and not jet-fueled-VC-hypergrowth, the company could have succeeded.

The WeWork core business model is not just "renting real estate". It's paying for long-term leases and then subleasing on short-term ones. The business model was always bad because office space is sensitive to the economic cycle and boom-bust cycles in office building. The closest it gets to working is a company like Regus, who services the fringes of the market, like companies that aren't big enough to get a regular lease, but they provide a bunch of add-on services.