This whole “Squeeze” thing is a function of liquidity. The reason that stocks like GME and AMC can experience the effects of a short squeeze is because of how relatively illiquid they are (i.e. point $1bn of consumer capital toward a $3bn stock with thin trading and you can do wild things).
The USD is the currency in which nearly all middle eastern oil is priced, the currency in which $16tn of consumer spending is done, quadrillions of stock trades, etc etc etc.
There’s no individual or group who can point enough capital at that to make for a squeeze, and even if they could, then why wouldn’t the treasury take advantage and start printing more dollars (see: Hertz issuing new shares and ruining wallstreetbet’s day)
It was bad for a lot of countries that had dollar-denominated debt, which is a bad idea precisely for this reason. Countries never learn though, it seems. But it was not too bad for the US actually.
In 1985, Soros bet that the Plaza Accord (a market manipulation among a cartel of leading economies to weaken the dollar for political reasons) [1] would work and he was right.
That has nothing to do with shorts or squeezes and everything to do with collusion among the Treasuries and Central Banks of something like 75% of the world economy at that point.
Soros 'won' the trade because he realized how impactful this collusion would be while the rest of the market didn't.
[1]https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21813/w218...
Also, I remembered what it was called, the Reagan’s “Imperial Circle”:
https://www.georgesoros.com/1984/05/23/the-danger-of-reagans...
edit: am I calculating this right? to do a Plaza today would need, not the G5, but pretty much the entire G20?
[0]https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/10/31/j...
[1]https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-11-19-fi-22750-...
Not very; it faced two (not deliberate) recently and dealt with them through QE; our monetary policy system is tuned to deal with that problem, the main failure mode is overshooting into inflation on the tail end.
We're a much smaller economy than the US, and have a big problem that whenever there's geopolitical instability, flight to quality appreciates our currency massively (despite negative nominal rates; we've broken pegs before because although they would've been nice to keep, the cost would've been prohibitive), which then hoses our innovative sectors, because they had been counting on being competitive in global exports.
I had been imagining that keeping a currency too elevated for too long would eventually stifle growth, and that would defo be more harmful than inflation. (for a loan-based economy, for example, substantial appreciation might mean that many borrowers would just default, for lack of any other option)
Edit: see the cousin comment: ...it was extremely hard to build a sustainable business in Russia, due to the fact that it was just cheaper to buy something from abroad
No, hence the speed and strength of Fed responses to anticipated deflation vs. anticipated above-optimal inflation.
OTOH, the Fed is also why the theoretical adverse impact is unlikely to materialize in any real world scenario.
If you're still unconvinced then look at the granddaddy of all deflations, the great depression. Caused by the freezing of trade it was (in most countries) experienced through the appreciation of the value of currency - deflation, rather than inflation.