Re:What really caused the eurozone crisis?
by chernevik on Thursday December 22, 2011 @11:56AM
(#3382220)
But it misses other issues:
- No discussion of "off balance" sheet government obligations, like pensions and entitlements. These don't count as "debt", as they aren't bonds, but they are long-term cash flow obligations that reduce resources available for debt service
- Likewise, no discussion of public sector compensation in excess of a position's productivity
- No discussion of economic growth rates, which expand the amount of debt a country can sustain
- No discussion of the role of low euro rates in private sector debt expansion. Markets presumed governments could and would bail out their banks, and thus didn't scrutinize bank assets for recovery values. (The graphic ignores financial sector debt, but that's debt _of_ the banks, not debt _to_ the banks.) The conflation of bank and government debt is a running theme in the euro crisis, see Sarkozy's remark that though the ECB wouldn't lend to governments it would lend to banks, and the banks would lend to governments, problem solved.
The graphic thus understates the sovereign obligations. By ignoring growth, it ignores the key variable driving differences in perceived debt sustainability. And by ignoring market preconceptions of government backstops for banks, it misses the role of the euro in those private sector debt levels.
The clue is this: why doesn't the graphic explain sovereign difficulties borrowing, evident in their rising yields? Bond buyers are saying that _governments_ won't be able to sustain their debts. That might reflect an opinion that governments will borrow unsustainably to bail out their banks. But then the solution would be to let the banks collapse and remove that possibility. But the governments can't do that because their economies are dependent on excess bank leverage for the growth they do have, and for the one source of financing they do have.
So if we agree the wicked bankers did it, we're saying that governments have been using excess bank leverage to hide the lack of fundamental growth, and extent of structural problems.
The truth is that the problem is excess leverage and spending in both public and private sectors.
P.S. It's the same story in the US, lagging by a few years and mitigated by our ability to print money.
- No discussion of "off balance" sheet government obligations, like pensions and entitlements. These don't count as "debt", as they aren't bonds, but they are long-term cash flow obligations that reduce resources available for debt service
- Likewise, no discussion of public sector compensation in excess of a position's productivity
- No discussion of economic growth rates, which expand the amount of debt a country can sustain
- No discussion of the role of low euro rates in private sector debt expansion. Markets presumed governments could and would bail out their banks, and thus didn't scrutinize bank assets for recovery values. (The graphic ignores financial sector debt, but that's debt _of_ the banks, not debt _to_ the banks.) The conflation of bank and government debt is a running theme in the euro crisis, see Sarkozy's remark that though the ECB wouldn't lend to governments it would lend to banks, and the banks would lend to governments, problem solved.
The graphic thus understates the sovereign obligations. By ignoring growth, it ignores the key variable driving differences in perceived debt sustainability. And by ignoring market preconceptions of government backstops for banks, it misses the role of the euro in those private sector debt levels.
The clue is this: why doesn't the graphic explain sovereign difficulties borrowing, evident in their rising yields? Bond buyers are saying that _governments_ won't be able to sustain their debts. That might reflect an opinion that governments will borrow unsustainably to bail out their banks. But then the solution would be to let the banks collapse and remove that possibility. But the governments can't do that because their economies are dependent on excess bank leverage for the growth they do have, and for the one source of financing they do have.
So if we agree the wicked bankers did it, we're saying that governments have been using excess bank leverage to hide the lack of fundamental growth, and extent of structural problems.
The truth is that the problem is excess leverage and spending in both public and private sectors.
P.S. It's the same story in the US, lagging by a few years and mitigated by our ability to print money.