BTW both Apple and Google have a way of doing end to end encryption of backups with a recovery option in the case of device loss. Apple deliberately chooses not to enable it for iMessage and iCloud photos (it is used for keychain passwords among other things). Credible news reports state that Apple did this at the explicit request of the FBI. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
Also note that Apple policies prohibit anyone else from offering cloud backups for iPhones, so you're SOL if you want cloud backups and privacy. Apple's way or the highway.
A minor point of fact (I have posted this Reuters link more than anyone): a careful reading of the article does not specify an explicit request. It is very much implicit in the article. There is no direct reporting on the request itself.
It is obvious that there was an explicit request. The article simply strongly implies it, because Reuters will not report as fact things they can not verify.
The point I was trying to make still stands. The recovery options are a form of key escrow. They require a recovery code. As I'm sure you know, if you lose your device and forget the recovery code, then it's total loss – the HSM will reset after a fixed number of tries. People are plenty capable of doing that, and with a billion devices, some non-trivial number of them do it regularly.
iMessage is end-to-end encrypted, but a key to decrypt messages is stored in iCloud backups.