Boundlessness means that X could be all domesticated animals, and Y=1 human. Surely that seems like not the right call, given that it would ultimately kill even more humans.
[Admittedly this is all error-prone hazy recollection, but] From what I understood, the original scenario in question was about a case where X was large, but not of critical strategic consequence to the availability of the animal(s) in question
Given a moral compass, yes.
EA is about not just looking at the immediate and the definite, the relative value of animals and humans is out of scope (though of course many individuals there will have opinions on it).
So should everyone be forced to value all future human lives as being as concretely valuable as our own? In order to put them into a total ordering of morality one is forced to make a judgement call on how many people we think are likely to exist in the future as well as how relevant our musings of today actually capture what life will be like in that future.
Effective altruists like to use exponential growth to beat people over the head with the idea that the future is more important than the present. Do they ever acknowledge the fact that the far future is also exponentially more unpredictable than seconds into the future?
It just reeks of hubris to me. To be a really effective altruist you must first create a time travel device.
Not in my experience and all the time respectively.
Better to save a life today, than a billion lives a century from now, because the unstoppable planet-killer asteroid is going to hit us in 99 years.
The reason I ask is that, when I first discovered Effective Altruism, finding the premise to be deeply compelling, I ended up staying up all night watching videos trying to reconcile / assimilate it into my world view. In one video, various trolley problem scenarios were enumerated, and the EA guests were advocating sparing a lamborghini to the detriment of a child's life so that the car could be sold off and the money donated to saving multiple children in the developing world. Furthermore, there was some suggestion of a threshold where the altruism of sparing X domesticated animals was 'higher' than sparing Y humans, which definitely felt like it fell into [citation needed] territory.