Landsburg actually addresses this in his next post! Regarding the Liar Paradox you bring up:
"""One of Kurt Godel’s great insights was that you can go a lot deeper by considering a slightly different sentence: “This sentence is not provable”. If that statement is false, then it’s provable. But surely no false statement should be provable! So maybe the statement is true. In that case, it’s true but not provable, which says something about the limits of logic. It says that not every true statement can be proved.""" [1]
fn 1: http://www.thebigquestions.com/2011/12/13/a-tale-of-three-pa...
Perhaps it can, but the challenge then is to identify what's different about the professor's statement from a statement like "It's raining". Why doesn't the first have a definite truth value, but the second does? (What the professor himself believes is not relevant to the actual truth of his statement.)
You might be interested in verificationism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism/#EmpVer... (apologies if you know about it already).
What's different about it is its circularity. The students' anticipations of the exam are based on their anticipations of the exam. Sort of like "this statement is false".
The students' anticipations of the exam are their anticipations of the exam. I don't see the circularity yet. It's clearer in the Liar Paradox.
Similarly, "this sentence is false" is neither true nor false, but just nonsense. "The set of all sets that do not contain themselves" is not a paradox or a contradiction, it simply describes an object that doesn't exist. Likewise, the professor's statement isn't known to be true or false at the time it's made, and either outcome is possible.