In CBC (with known IV) you only get the same ciphertext for identical blocks in the beginning of different transmissions if you use the same key for both transmissions. As you're not supposed to use the same key twice for a stream cipher, it's not a really big issue.
It is not a "really big issue" in the sense of "we forgot to put a MAC on this ciphertext to guarantee authenticity", which is a more common mistake than not setting an IV; or, a "really big issue" in the sense of "we managed to expose a padding oracle", which is a more common CBC mistake. But it is a significant mistake.
How you choose to key streams is an orthogonal concern to whether your block cipher mode leaks data.
Sorry for the pedantry.
I actually agree with you that not requiring an explicit IV is a bad interface choice.
On the other hand, I'm appalled by the idea of any library that exposes AES directly to applications anyways. There's a myriad of mistakes developers make using AES directly. CBC IVs are not among the top three.
But ECB mode may be a useful primitive component of some other, more secure, mode. For example, this API doesn't support CTR mode, but if you needed it, probably the most efficient thing would be to fill a buffer with your nonce and counter values pass it to this API to be encrypted using "ECB mode". It's parallelizable that way.
And that is the point of this level of crypto API: providing efficient access to whatever software implementation or hardware acceleration may be available on the target system.
And yet libraries far more popular than this one aren't subject to blog posts dinging them for being "broken by default".
I want to give Nadim some credit here: he is thinking like an attacker now!
This represents a great improvement over his previous crypto implementation endeavors.
And, I agree with the fundmental point he's making: optional IVs for CBC mode are a bad interface details for lay programmers. Just remember, every AES library makes similar (usually worse) design mistakes.
Generalists are very poorly served by low-level AES libraries (where "low level" certainly includes any library where you have to think about IVs or, indeed, which block cipher mode to use).
How big a deal is CBC with an all-zeroes IV? Well, it's less of a big deal than ECB mode, which is the default in even more AES libraries. But ECB mode, is (inexplicably) an actual "mode". ECB is harder to single out as an error than an all-zeroes IV, which is explainable only as a mistake. Also, no library on the iPhone ships with a ECB default, unlike, say, OpenSSL, Cryptlib, the Java crypto extensions, &c.
In both ECB mode and CBC-with-predictable-IV mode, the problem is that the same 16 bytes of plaintext will (often, in CBC's case; always, in ECB) produce the same ciphertext. This increases malleability and allows attackers to easily rewrite messages. More importantly, if an attacker controls the size of any part of the input, they can arrange to create ciphertext blocks with only 1-2 unknown bytes, which are trivially brute forced.
By the way: here's more than you ever wanted to know about IVs in CBC mode:
http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2029640
If you just want to know what "IV" means, it's "fictitious first ciphertext block in a block cipher mode that involves chaining ciphertext values".