The key difference is that digital signatures allow revocation-of-trust to be an effortless, automatic and delegatable process. As opposed to the current process that involves individual (and intrinsically limited) knowledge of who can be trusted. Frequently one doesn't even have provenance information for a media item, which is a prerequisite for making a trustworthiness judgment call.
The "hocus pocus" is literally the point that distinguishes this scheme from the plainly non-working system that we have today.
I'm not seeing anything in your description that couldn't also be said about using PKI to allow people to sign stuff they published. (And better: it's not broken by non-deceptive edits, like cropping or brightness adjustments)-- except that PKI already exists so we can't imagine that it would magically solve these problems. :) (and there is a long long history of people thinking varrious PKI ideas will magically solve varrious problems and then failing to solve them at all)
(I mean cameras that produced 'signed' output is also a thing that has previously existed too: https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2011/04/nikon-image-authenticatio... and was never particularly popular even with the target market)
Yes, I'm aware this leaves the door open for subversion of certification authorities by nation-states. It's still better than the nothing we have today.
> Anyway who is gonna build this?
If and when specialized imaging sensors become available, I don't see this being a huge lift. One wouldn't even need purpose-built cameras for all but the most high-assurance recording requirements. Remote attestation and trusted code execution is already being incorporated into most newer devices. Bringing it all together would mostly be a software problem at that point.
Of course, there would also need to be a value proposition to justify any kind of work towards this. I personally see this as an inevitability given the frightening pace of progress in the ML field, and the increasing public concern over things like deepfakes.
Thank you for your comments!
I don't see how it all comes together without a partnership between the tech companies that display media (Youtube, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) and the tech companies that provide hardware (Apple, Google, Samsung, etc.) Maybe what's needed is to go through a nonprofit like the Partnership on AI.
Google is an interesting target because they are the only company that's both a media displayer and a hardware provider. If Android devices get a "verified non-deepfake" capability before Apple devices get it, I could see that as being a significant leg up for Android actually. It encroaches on Apple's traditional branding of "we make products for important people". I wonder if the Titan M has capabilities which could be leveraged. https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/building-t...
Trusted timestamping can attest that a given piece of media was not created after a given instance in time.
Trusted hardware running trusted code, combined with remote attestation, can offer a high-degree of assurance that a given video clip is not a product of CGI/ML.
Digital signatures by the entity responsible for a video clip's capture/creation mitigates the creation of media not sanctioned by that entity. Subjects in a particular piece of media could additionally apply their digital signatures to further increase trust in its authenticity. (This is effectively a cryptographically enforced version of your third point.)
This isn't a silver bullet, and suffers all the pitfalls normally encountered in the implementation of cryptographic schemes.