That last part is significant because while the Bitcoin marketing team likes to talk about it being anonymous or “censorship resistant”, it's extremely risky for anyone to use when their threat model includes the government they live under. Yes, I'm sure someone has been able to transfer money to a Russian or Chinese dissident but once that becomes at all significant, consider the incredible risk that poses to the recipient. They can't make a transaction without making highly-distinctive network traffic, they can't use the funds locally without finding someone willing to take them which is risky to both parties since you're betting that the other party isn't compromised, and unlike regular currency transactions you're leaving an immutable public audit trail. If any party involved ever has records which the police obtain, they now have hard evidence to go after everyone they've ever transacted with rather than just the ones they observed after learning of that blackmarket activity. Better hope that you and everyone you ever do business with has perfect opsec…

This isn't some idle speculation, either — there have been a number of cases where Bitcoin provided key evidence linking people's activity and allowing the police to wrap up an entire group rather than the one guy they caught. Here's an example of where that was used for good:

https://www.wired.com/story/tracers-in-the-dark-welcome-to-v...

Now, I personally would not like to see political dissidents in China or Russia meet the same fate so I would not want to tell them Bitcoin is suitable for this task.