$ patchinfo openssl
3.0.6 LTS
Patches:
Cve-2022-xxx
Cve-2022-xxx
Etc
Introducing a new tool will only add another on top of the existing tools, when nothing tells us that people will use it! (plug the xkcd on n standards -> fix with a better standard -> n +1 standards)
Basically, you want to make everyone use a single tool when humans always strive to build something better or just different :)
The best we could hope to achieve is to have the CVE MITRE database start accepting "patched in" strings from all the distributors (so as Ubuntu pushes a signed and patched package to the archive, it pings the CVE db with a new version string for eg. Ubuntu-22.04 namespace).
Even that gets tricky with dependencies and issues covering multiple packages ("this is only patched if you've updated both of these"), though that's a technically solvable problem.
I also think that you’re probably right we the patched in, it’s not infinitely scalable, but I doubt it needs to be anyway
For instance, plenty of upstream software never even releases security fixes in older versions, yet distributions might be committed to supporting them for 5 or 10 years in their LTS releases.
The only universal solution to this is back-porting: it reduces the risk of exposing LTS release customers to backwards compatibility issues, but increases the risk of a bad patch slightly.
If upstreams cared about the things distro customers cared about too (don't break my stuff I haven't changed), it would be much easier to put the blame solely on distros, but they don't.