Re:We handled a recent phishing incident that targeted Dropbox
by computerfriend on Tuesday November 01, 2022 @10:23AM
(#33421622)
Storing API keys in Git, nice.
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Re:We handled a recent phishing incident that targeted Dropbox
by not2b on Tuesday November 01, 2022 @11:55AM
(#33422958)
Apparently this was a private repo, not a public one, but the attacker gained access.
Re:We handled a recent phishing incident that targeted Dropbox
by shkkmo on Tuesday November 01, 2022 @12:02PM
(#33423092)
It is still a very bad idea to store unencrypted keys in a private repository. You've now equated read access of your repository will whatever access that key has.
Re:We handled a recent phishing incident that targeted Dropbox
by rtev on Tuesday November 01, 2022 @03:42PM
(#33426415)
That doesn’t matter, best practice is storing them as variables that are injected upon deployment from a secret manager.
Re:We handled a recent phishing incident that targeted Dropbox
by insanitybit on Tuesday November 01, 2022 @03:56PM
(#33426610)
FWIW Dropbox had robust infrastructure to do exactly that when I was there as well as scanning for API keys in the main repository.
Certainly product code is going to conform to the pattern you've described, this sounds to me like some of the random non-product projects that may hit some external non-dbx API were not doing things properly and it flew under the radar for whatever reason. I highly doubt these API keys could have been used for much.
So yes, I agree with you, but here's some context.
Disclaimer: I haven't worked there since 2019
Re:We handled a recent phishing incident that targeted Dropbox
by bastawhiz on Tuesday November 01, 2022 @09:17PM
(#33430260)
If it was GitHub and they were using GitHub auth for circleci, they could have gotten access to injected secrets. Or, if they used GitHub actions, it could have been actions environment variables. It isn't clear that keys were checked into source control.