no. The argument is that "it feels like something to be me", and then to ask "how can it be possible to feel anything?"
qualia is a term from philosophy that is essentially a synonym for "having an experience" or "it is like something to be X"
nobody says "it feels like there are qualia". the closest would be "i have experience, and we call that qualia"
How about an objective argument that isn't dependent on assuming its own conclusions and sneaky, poorly defined and impossible thought experiments?
It's like arguing with a religious person about the existence of god.
Stop pretending the hard problem being a problem is some cut and dry thing. It simply is not.
And I'll generally side with the philosopher who understands more about how actual brains work, which is clearly Dennett.
Mary's room, The Chinese Room and friends seem designed around fundamental misunderstandings of how the brain, psychology and computation actually work.
They're designed to evoke a sort of visceral reaction. "Of course Mary won't understand what it's like to see red". But once you dig into the details of it, the logic breaks down.
Look, it certainly feels that way to me too. But that's not an argument. It's not even evidence. It also feels like it's impossible for me not to exist, and yet the evidence has me entirely convinced that will happen one day.
In any case, as a non-philosopher I can only gather that among philosophers, this is a highly contentious issue in philosophy of mind, and let the sides try to convince me.
When I read Dennett, he uses an immense breadth of knowledge on neural anatomy, computation, evolution, and cognitive psychology.
When I read arguments from the likes of Chalmers and Searle, I find highly contrived, seemingly circular thought experiments that are purposely constructed to purport their argument as fundamentally true. Feels more like theology to me.