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Re:DoS attack against Diffie-Hellman protocol by c0r0n3r on Wednesday October 12, 2022 @06:30PM (#33184548)
Who is affected?

Websites, mail servers, and other Transport Layer Security (TLS) dependent services that support Diffie-Hellman key exchange using ephemeral keys (DHE cipher suites) are at risk of the DHEat attack. Services using other cryptographic protocols can also be affected.

* Secure Shell (SSH) services support Diffie-Hellman key exchange methods. * Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) services offer DH groups. * OpenVPN servers support Diffie-Hellman key exchange in the control channel (DHE TLS ciphers).

Re:DoS attack against Diffie-Hellman protocol by josephcsible on Wednesday October 12, 2022 @06:57PM (#33184871)
DHE has already been considered weak, with ECDHE as the recommended replacement, for a long time now, so I suspect that most systems operated by people who take security seriously already won't be vulnerable to this.
Re:DoS attack against Diffie-Hellman protocol by meltyness on Wednesday October 12, 2022 @09:26PM (#33186067)
Your post corroborates SUSE[0] claims that ECDHE is not vulnerable to this. Default golang TLS server looks like it's got it's head on straight for this.

[0] https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000020510

Re:DoS attack against Diffie-Hellman protocol by jslaD on Wednesday October 12, 2022 @07:36PM (#33185225)
I’m getting a certificate error.
Re:DoS attack against Diffie-Hellman protocol by LinuxBender on Wednesday October 12, 2022 @08:31PM (#33185681)
Re:DoS attack against Diffie-Hellman protocol by justinludwig on Thursday October 13, 2022 @01:57AM (#33187740)
Looks like the URL for this post should be this instead: https://dheatattack.com/
Re:DoS attack against Diffie-Hellman protocol by cft on Thursday October 13, 2022 @04:48AM (#33188713)
This is one year old (11/11/21), see date at the bottom:

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2002-20001

Re:DoS attack against Diffie-Hellman protocol by CodesInChaos on Thursday October 13, 2022 @03:27PM (#33195388)
I'm a bit confused what the attack is. Is it just that SSL handshakes are expensive for the server, while the client avoids the computational cost because it chooses a random public key instead of one for which it knows the private key?

And why doesn't this also apply to plain RSA and ECDHE_RSA suites, which need to compute an expensive RSA private key operation, which should be similarly expensive as DH?