OAuth is a set of flows for obtaining tokens. These toekns are, by definition, bound to an application-user grant.
The rest is implementation details.
Which flow are you referring to as being succeptible to mitm attack?
Your question about MITM is answered at http://www.subbu.org/blog/2010/09/oauth-2-0-and-cookie-conve....
The identity question is not in any way addressed by OAuth. It is up to the application implementation to handle identifying the user creating the grant.
The link you provided basically establishes the same problem which is always the case - if someone is watching your (unencrypted) traffic, you're hosed.
It's as though you're saying that your rolling pin doesn't work well as a meat tenderizer. Yeah, I guess they're related, but that's not what a rolling pin does.
First, OAuth1's poorly-spec'd signatures make implementation difficult. That's an accepted and pretty well-documented fact.
OAuth2 removes all crypto and instead relies on bearer tokens and SSL/TLS, while not mandating it. It does away with signatures in favour of ease of implementation. [edit] This is a bad thing.
OAuth2 is also susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks where a malicious party could gain access if it intercepts a token.
That's a pretty poor implementation.
As an identity provider OAuth 1 and 2 have problems beyond the technical interpretation of the specs, or implementation difficulties. Both fail as an identity system (ref. http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2004/12/09/thelaws.html).
I'd love to hear why you think OAuth is a solid solution.