Re:Serious vulnerabilities in Matrix’s end-to-end encryption...
by tptacek on Friday September 30, 2022 @12:01AM
(#33030761)
Signal didn't allow servers to control group membership prior to the 2019 design!
Re:Serious vulnerabilities in Matrix’s end-to-end encryption...
by palata on Sunday October 02, 2022 @09:57AM
(#33055897)
And the zero-knowledge groups still don't give that capability to the servers, do they?
Re:Serious vulnerabilities in Matrix’s end-to-end encryption...
by tptacek on Sunday October 02, 2022 @09:07PM
(#33062217)
No, of course not: it's part of the premise of a secure group messenger that the server can't control the groups. Which is what makes it so incredible that Matrix screwed this up so completely.
So yes: we should switch to client-controlled membership management, and we've already started the work to do so. However, the Matrix spec and its implementations has always been transparent that it's up to the user to verify the membership of the room - for after all, if they don't bother verifying users, then all bets will always be off anyway. For instance https://element.io/blog/e2e-encryption-by-default-cross-sign... explicitly says: "You’ve verified this user, but they have risky unverified sessions logged in! A room containing any red users is shown as red." I'm not sure this exactly counts as a research result, let alone a devastating one.
However, totally agreed that we can improve on this, and we're on the case.