"Of course you may not trust me about any of [the examples you wrote about]. And so my purpose today is not to propose a new litmus test to replace atheism.
But I do propose that before you give anyone credit for being a smart, rational skeptic, that you ask them to defend some non-mainstream belief...you ought to have to stick your neck out and say something a little less usual - say where you are not skeptical (and most of your tribemates are) or where you are skeptical (and most of the people in your tribe are not)."
I don't see how it can be written any clearer than that. The point of picking those examples is not that they are the perfect tests of skepticism; it's that most of the Less Wrong readership has thought hard about cryonics, many-worlds, nanotech, and AI, and so they are some reasonable examples.
However, I also find the whole idea of a "skeptic test" a bit disquieting. Paraphrasing what you quoted above: "Don't give someone credit for being a smart, rational skeptic until they have defended some non-mainstream belief, until they have stuck their neck out to say something a little less usual." That's a bit aggressive for my taste.
The details? Just as you say.
The main argument of the piece is: don't trust that someone who calls themselves a skeptic is a "good" skeptic until they've expressed a skeptical opinion that cuts against the grain of mainstream belief. Otherwise, they may be just pretending to be a rationalist when they really just believe whatever the mainstream believes.
These are his main examples:
> Personally, I think that Michael Shermer blew it by mocking molecular nanotechnology, and Penn and Teller blew it by mocking cryonics ... Conversely, Richard Dawkins scooped up a huge truckload of actual-discriminating-skeptic points, at least in my book, for not making fun of the many-worlds interpretation when he was asked about in an interview;
The Dawkins example demonstrates his thesis very clearly. Dawkins is skeptical of a generally accepted theory (that the OP is also skeptical of) therefore the OP now considers him an "actual-disciminating-skeptic". However, his first two examples attempt to support the inverse of his thesis: if someone expresses a skeptical opinion that agrees with the mainstream, then they are not a "good" skeptic ("they blew it"). But that is a ridiculous claim that the OP himself dismisses in the first few paragraphs talking about how religion is no longer a good litmus test for skepticism. So, it seems like the OP is actually arguing that if a self professed skeptic expresses a mainstream skeptical opinion that the OP disagrees with, then they are not a "good" skeptic. Which is a bad, close-minded argument. The OP places himself in a "rationalist" tribe where dissenting opinions are no more tolerated than they are in the mainstream tribe.