Re:Age – a simple, modern and secure file encryption tool, f...
by benlivengood on Monday September 26, 2022 @04:38PM
(#32988042)
I was going to agree completely but I think there's a use-case where age can work sensibly; distribute separate public keys to each semi-trusted host to perform its own automated backups. Rotate the keys frequently. There's still a significant advantage over symmetric encryption; the backups themselves will never be readable by an attacker who compromises a semi-trusted host.
The reason this scenario makes sense is that even if backups were encrypted and signed with gpg an attacker gaining root access to the semi-trusted host would also have access to its signing key and be able to impersonate it anyway. By only accepting backups from particular hosts based on its currently-valid public key we can avoid the risk of an attacker overwriting arbitrary backups.
You're going to be rotating either a gpg signing key or an age public key frequently regardless to reduce the time window when a potential attacker can impersonate a host, so age makes things slightly simpler by avoiding signatures entirely.
The reason this scenario makes sense is that even if backups were encrypted and signed with gpg an attacker gaining root access to the semi-trusted host would also have access to its signing key and be able to impersonate it anyway. By only accepting backups from particular hosts based on its currently-valid public key we can avoid the risk of an attacker overwriting arbitrary backups.
You're going to be rotating either a gpg signing key or an age public key frequently regardless to reduce the time window when a potential attacker can impersonate a host, so age makes things slightly simpler by avoiding signatures entirely.