In any case i clicked on the github link for AGE and it said ChaCha20-Poly1305, which is an authenticated encryption (AEAD) algorithm, so im very confused by your comment. Am i missing something?
In other words: it establishes that the data was encrypted to the expected key (and is not just random data being transformed by the cryptosystem), but not that a particular entity encrypted to that key.
(age does provide de-facto authenticated encryption when you use it with a passphrase, since the passphrase effectively forms a proof of identity. But not with asymmetric keypairs.)
Its possible that i am mistaken (not a crypto expert), but usually the term "authenticated encryption" means the ciphertext is verified to not have been modified by an attacker (to for example do a padding oracle attack, although that wouldnt apply to a stream cipher of course). It has nothing to do with authenticating the source of the message or verifying the entire message has not been replaced by a different valid ciphertext - that's a totally different thing.
So Age provides authenticated encryption. It does not prevent an attacker who knows the public key from substituting in a different ciphertext, because that has nothing to do with authenticated encryption.
With an X25519 identity, age will guarantee that, if you can decrypt, then you are decrypting a message that was encrypted to a public key that you have the private half of. This is an improvement over some schemes, where decryption is potentially malleable (with a small enough message and enough tries, an attacker can make you decrypt something that looks valid but wasn't actually encrypted correctly). But it can't guarantee that you should trust everything that's encrypted against your public key.
Note that since PGP addresses offline non-connected media it is simpler to directly authenticate the material. So the sort of thing that is being described here as "authenticated encryption" is not usually relevant[2].
>On top of that, every PGP implementation that I've ever worked with happily streams unauthenticated, decrypted plaintext before completing MDC verification.
For offline non-connected media, that is a completely reasonable approach. Not everything works like TLS.
We can nitpick about the factuality of the "16 bit" claim or the truncation attack (which I believe GPG has since fixed), but neither directly contradicts the above.
> Note that since PGP addresses offline non-connected media it is simpler to directly authenticate the material. So the sort of thing that is being described here as "authenticated encryption" is not usually relevant[2].
Okay, but you just pointed to this property as a "huge footgun" in age. Why is it a footgun there, and not in PGP?
Besides, this is entirely ignoring actual use patterns: age is intended for offline file encryption, while PGP is used in all kinds of online channels and directly advertises itself as a "toolbox" for any purpose.
Again, PGP does not do things the same way TLS does. I do not see how you can possibly prove that other approaches can not be secure.
>We can nitpick about the factuality of the "16 bit" claim or the truncation attack (which I believe GPG has since fixed), but neither directly contradicts the above.
There is no nitpicking involved here. The claim is straight up wrong. The author of The PGP Principle either misread the email thread or deliberately misrepresented it. GPG could not fix that which was not broken.
>Okay, but you just pointed to this property as a "huge footgun" in age. Why is it a footgun there, and not in PGP?
Please read this article to understand how PGP does things:
* https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:authenticated
>PGP is used in all kinds of online channels and directly advertises itself as a "toolbox" for any purpose.
I think I will have to ask for a reference here. I have never seen a claim that PGP is good for online types of media.
The symmetric encryption in Age is authenticated. GPG 2.3 offers AEADs (and before that MDC, though I am not sure of error behavior recently).
[1] https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:no_new_ae [2] https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:authenticated
Edit: On top of that, every PGP implementation that I've ever worked with happily streams unauthenticated, decrypted plaintext before completing MDC verification.
[1]: https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html