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Re:Wasmtime 1.0 by btown on Tuesday September 20, 2022 @02:04PM (#32915537)
I would add that it can be useful to have isolated runtimes even if you're not a PaaS. Say you need to parse an obscure file format that can be uploaded from untrusted users (and nowadays, that's all users). You've got some ancient C or C++ source code for the parser, but it hasn't been vetted for security or denial-of-service issues. Compile it to WASM, run it in an isolated runtime, and you can be confident that it won't be able to escape its sandbox while also minimizing startup times and using significantly fewer resources than needing a container for each invocation.
Re:Wasmtime 1.0 by cesarb on Tuesday September 20, 2022 @04:47PM (#32917591)
> You've got some ancient C or C++ source code for the parser, but it hasn't been vetted for security or denial-of-service issues. Compile it to WASM, run it in an isolated runtime, and you can be confident that it won't be able to escape its sandbox

This is not just a theory: according to https://hacks.mozilla.org/2021/12/webassembly-and-back-again... Firefox does exactly that trick with five of its C or C++ dependencies.

Re:Wasmtime 1.0 by jon-wood on Tuesday September 20, 2022 @02:16PM (#32915722)
Personally I’d want to be very cautious about this. It’s probably more secure than just running this untrusted binary directly on a server full of user uploaded content but I don’t know what level of confidence is should have in wasmtime not having any container escapes possible.
Re:Wasmtime 1.0 by schemescape on Tuesday September 20, 2022 @02:36PM (#32915993)
Yes. Consider that Spectre allowed reading browser memory that wasn’t exposed to JavaScript from within the JS sandbox. Something similar probably would have been possible with WASM, if Spectre hadn’t already been found and mitigated.

I love capability based limits like this (and in Deno), but they’re not a panacea.