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Re:Uber investigating breach of its computer systems by mcstempel on Friday September 16, 2022 @12:33PM (#32868569)
100%. The common thread in all of these recent attacks (Uber, Twilio, Okta, etc) is the “phishability” of the authentication methods involved -- as you mention, the unphishability of WebAuthn is what makes it particularly compelling.

What’s head-scratching to me is why tech-forward enterprises haven’t been faster to adopt unphishable forms of authentication like WebAuthn. I’m biased as I run an identity and access management company (stytch.com), but I hope more companies will consider integrating WebAuthn to support unphishable MFA.

Today, WebAuthn introduces some nuances that can discourage a B2C company from supporting it today (e.g. account recovery with lost devices), but it’s a clear win for corporate network/workplace authentication and B2B apps. I believe some of the lack of adoption is due to complexity to build (more complex than traditional MFA) and cost for off-the-shelf solutions (Incumbents like Auth0/Okta require ~$30k annual commitments to let developers use WebAuthn). If developers decide to build with Stytch, WebAuthn is included in our pay-as-you-go plan and can be integrated in an afternoon(https://stytch.com/products/webauthn)

Re:Uber investigating breach of its computer systems by trollied on Friday September 16, 2022 @01:37PM (#32869455)
I’ve not read up about webauthn yet. How does it work & what makes it unphishable?
Re:Uber investigating breach of its computer systems by mcstempel on Friday September 16, 2022 @03:47PM (#32871108)
Here's a bit more background on WebAuthn: https://stytch.com/blog/an-introduction-to-webauthn/

What makes it unphishable is that the authentication is not based upon something that a user can be deceived into sharing with an attacker. Passwords and one-time passcodes (OTPs) can both be remotely acquired from users when attackers convince users to share these text-based verifications with them.

Because WebAuthn validates possession of a primary device that was previously enrolled (either the computer/phone the user is leveraging for the biometric check or the user's YubiKey), it's device-bound and cannot be phished.