Actually, can we mark AWS as insecure? Seriously, it was a bother at the time it was rolled out but now I could say that Amazon is insecure. If they could not bother with this, there are definitely more security holes intentionally hidden from the general public.
(Non-root MFA can be reset by another admin or root so this is most of a concern for the root account)
I fail to see how that can be true. How will they validate that it is you on the phone?
I classed that as more secure since you can't do it remotely and the in-person portion further increases the difficulty.
It's been a little over a year since I've done it but as I recall this is how it goes. You receive an email with a link that takes you to a site that starts a verification process via the phone. You get a number from the site that you are prompted to enter when they call you on the phone. Once that's done you can log into the account with the MFA device and then even remove the MFA device entirely.
The email address I believe can only be changed by AWS (and at least the last time this was an issue for me can't ever be reused for a new AWS account).
The phone number can be changed by anyone with aws-portal:ModifyAccount, which probably means someone with admin access. It is NOT restricted to being modified by the root account.
So if you have a working access to an account with that permission and access to the email you can change the phone number to one you have access to and go through the whole process. Meaning if you have the above permission you really only need access to the email.
Link to the documentation for this flow: https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/reset-your-aws-root-ac...
Both email and phone numbers have widely known and exploited vulnerabilities that won't ever be fixed (worse if the phone part is only SMS). Requiring both at the same time is OKish, but not any exemplary security.
I recently got a notification to create a separate AWS account (I don’t use it), and thought might as well enable 2FA. Added the first key. Looked for a way to add the backup key. Was confused, removed 2FA. What is that, lockout Russian roulette?
Apples plan is that I need to own several Apple devices for that, this is a non-starter for me.
Yubikeys have the advantage of working with all browsers
Passkeys: same, or one of the other participating devices.
Last year, Apple shipped the first version of this: you can enroll your phone (or TouchID-equipped Mac) on sites like GitHub.com and it’ll use the Secure Enclave for WebAuthn secrets. I’ve been doing this since 15.4 came out and it’s great. Prior to that, I used a Yubikey 5 with USB and NFC, which is still handy since that’s where I store TOTP seeds for less secure sites.
Passkeys extend that idea further by allowing you to register once and have it synced rather than having to register every device on every site[1].
That last part is important because AWS has a huge barrier: the number of MFA devices you get is one, which means you either need insecure things like synced TOTP seeds or you have to be comfortable never losing your Yubikey. I have been asking our TAM to prioritize fixing that for years so backups can be a real thing.
1. Over simplified a little - hear Adam Langley at https://securitycryptographywhatever.buzzsprout.com/1822302/... for the right version