No, I don't think so. Russia intervened in Belarus to keep Lukashenka (sp) in power, against the will of the people. I don't think the people were asking for Belarus to join NATO, though. So I think that Russia has more "red lines" than NATO. A color revolution and/or a real democracy anywhere in the former USSR is a red line, at least while Putin is in power. (Because Putin very deeply fears a color revolution in Russia.)
And I think that's the deeper point. These aren't Russia's red lines; they're Putin's. And Putin may develop other things that become "red lines", because the bottom line is "anything that Putin feels threatened by". That's not a reasonable expectation to place on other nations. Ukraine and Belarus are not Putin's playthings, nor his colonies. "Don't do anything Putin doesn't like" is not something that independent nations have to play along with.
But I do not want to get stuck in the details of the actual events now because as you point out there is a more fundamental issue independent of the actual events. And I almost completely agree with the way you describe it as an unstable situation with positive feedback. Not sure if you wanted to say that this feedback loop formed in 2014, but if, then I would disagree. This cycle existed essentially since the end of the Soviet Union - Ukraine moves towards NATO, threats or actions in opposition, more incentive to seek NATO membership. Rinse and repeat. The specific events of course change but it is always the same cycle.
It doesn't matter if one side was "right", it doesn't matter who made the first move, Russia's reactions were driving Ukraine more firmly into the camp of the west.
With the first part I agree, but the second one is onesided. This is only one of the links in the cycle but in the same way any move towards NATO forces Russia to up their threats or even take action. And in that link it is not only the actions of Ukraine that matter but also outside actions. For example the USA wanting to support specific political groups in Ukraine in 2014 is also something that fuels the cycle as it may also move Ukraine closer to a NATO membership.
Ignoring everything after the war started because we are talking about how it started, it seems to me that everything you mentioned is related to the NATO issue, isn't it? I did some reading on the history of Ukraine Russia relations and I would say all things considered they got along pretty okay besides the NATO membership issue. Crimea is probably the biggest friction point but even there the longterm leases look like an acceptable compromise.
And let me return once more to the cycle which should have been broken long ago and must be broken at some point to achieve stability. Where can it be broken? Convince Russia that NATO in Ukraine is not a threat. Not going to happen any time soon just as a Chinese presence in Mexico would not be acceptable to the USA. A long time ago directly after the end of the Cold War this might have been possible with Russia itself becoming a NATO member. And obviously Ukraine remaining neutral or at most having only a special membership in NATO like Norway with no foreign assets on its territory.
Both have only become harder with the war and beyond that you either need radical changes like disappearing countries or become really creative. I think someone actually pointed some non-obviouse direction out to me but unfortunately I do not remember.