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Re:Forward Secrecy for Google HTTPS by marshray on Wednesday November 23, 2011 @12:15AM (#3268861)
People might turn on EDH and then decide it's too expensive, or if they come under attack, they can easily configure it off again.

Unlike, say, the new mandatory 2048 bit RSA key length requirements.

Re:Forward Secrecy for Google HTTPS by benblack on Wednesday November 23, 2011 @12:46AM (#3268941)
Seems like a lot of folks missed the section of the post explaining their implementation and use of _ECDHE_ not _EDH_. The performance impact of ECDHE is surprisingly small.
Re:Forward Secrecy for Google HTTPS by marshray on Wednesday November 23, 2011 @02:28AM (#3269167)
It doesn't help that Apache has a setting "kEDH - Ephemeral (temp.key) Diffie-Hellman key exchange (no cert)" and "EDH - all ciphers using Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange" that (I think) maps to what IETF TLS calls "DHE - Ephemeral DH".

I get these confused all the time, and now they add in an "EC" prefix!