Re:Some Authy 2FA accounts were compromised in Twilio data b...
by slowbdotro on Saturday August 27, 2022 @07:13PM
(#32624171)
Technically yes, but from memory, your U2F public key would be leaked. Thus depending on your threat model you may still want to rotate U2F keys.
Re:Some Authy 2FA accounts were compromised in Twilio data b...
by quickcheck on Saturday August 27, 2022 @07:47PM
(#32624385)
I thought ‘public’ means it can be shared widely without there being a risk to the private key. What threat model would consider it a risk to have a public key exposed?
Re:Some Authy 2FA accounts were compromised in Twilio data b...
by password4321 on Saturday August 27, 2022 @10:07PM
(#32625098)
Identity/privacy: de-anonymizing accounts reusing the same public key.
Re:Some Authy 2FA accounts were compromised in Twilio data b...
by lazka on Sunday August 28, 2022 @02:18AM
(#32626216)
U2F generates a new keypair for each origin. Public keys are not re-used.
Re:Some Authy 2FA accounts were compromised in Twilio data b...
by dijonman2 on Saturday August 27, 2022 @07:11PM
(#32624162)
Think of it as an HSM. It will most likely prevent the TOTP seed from being leaked but that doesn’t implicitly keep you safe.
Re:Some Authy 2FA accounts were compromised in Twilio data b...
by avg_dev on Saturday August 27, 2022 @07:13PM
(#32624176)
Sorry, I was asking about U2F as an alternative to TOTP and not a method of implementing such. If I’m not mistaken that was unclear on my part and you were led to interpret what I said a different way than I intended.
Edit: some reading: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_2nd_Factor I have the advantages and disadvantages section a read and I believe I got it right. The one major disadvantage I’ve read about is that there is no backup. At a place I worked, we registered two keys and kept one as a backup. It seemed to work okay.
Also this: https://www.yubico.com/blog/otp-vs-u2f-strong-to-stronger/
On OTP:
> The remaining issues, however, are phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks, the most infamous assaults that defeat OTP technology. The theory is quite simple: the hacker sets up a fake website designed to trick visitors into submitting their credentials. When a user falls into the trap and enters his information (user name, password, and even his one-time password), it is immediately intercepted by the hacker and used to access the victim’s account.
Later, on FIDO U2F:
> Real-time challenge-response schemes like U2F address OTP vulnerabilities such as phishing and various forms of man-in-the-middle attacks. As the legitimate server is issuing the challenge, if a rogue site or middle-man manipulates the flow, the server will detect an abnormality in the response and deny the transaction.