You very conveniently left out the fact that pretty much anything that views untrusted content has to parse files. If parsing files is where your "security boundaries" lie, I suggest you drop your computer off at the garbage dump. Hell if your editor has a preview function it too will parse untrusted content. Basically, to do anything software has to parse untrusted content. And just by the way, /etc/passwd is not attacker controlled. If the attacker has access to your filesystem already, she really doesnt need to use kitty to do anything. And "opening" README.md will not cause kitty to parse files, unless by "opening" you mean catting without -v. In which case we are back to your mommy told you to know better but you didn't listen.
At this point its obvious you are deliberately trying to spread FUD. I am done interacting with you. Good bye.
The general trick with parsing is to put it in a sandbox that cannot touch files, can only do limited syscalls, etc. This is what e.g. Chrome does.
But yes, it's obvious the Kitty author has no interest in making it more secure ( https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/issues/2084) and it's obviously you take discussions about improving software security as attacks on your person.
Have a good day, sir.
Furthermore the next release of kitty has capability based security for remote control with public key crypto to keep the data safe: https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/discussions/5320
I suggest you find a better place to move the goalposts in your attempts to smear and spread FUD.
Me asking my editor to open /etc/passwd is me asking my editor to do something. My terminal emulator opening files and parsing them and deleting them just because I viewed untrusted content is something different. If you want to make that argument, you need to come up with an example where my editor accesses attacker-controlled files because I opened a random README.md.
Also, please read https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html, and shove your attitude.