/me not a security expert. But isn't this the mistake I used to make for years: to believe that the hacker is a human, responding to his environment and making decisions? It took me a long time to acknowledge that nearly all network attacks are automated, and unless it's a highly targeted attack, the attack script won't care whether you're a corporation or a couch-potato in a basement.
But the sinister targeted ones where you only find out because someone is selling terabytes of confidential data, those are usually highly targeted and manual. It's very hard to automate and stay under the radar.
You need protection against both.
It doesn't surprise me that "sinister targeted" attacks are also "usually highly targeted".
People still have this idea of the lone hooded hacker doing everything from their bedroom.
In reality, people specialise in different aspects of cracking security and sell what they have to someone else. So someone is in the market for a zero day, or a compromised system in the government or a company, and they can just buy that.
For home users, the payoff isn't big enough to be worth more than automated type attacks. So you escape the human in the loop mostly.
If you work on highly sensitive systems then you should expect a human in the loop at some point.
I don't; I'm retired. I have only my home network to fret about. I don't have data to lose, but I don't want some rotter using my network to attack other networks. That rotter isn't going to set up automation to grab my family photos; but he'll use automation to attack other networks.
I've never worked with "highly sensitive systems", as far as I'm aware. I've only ever worked with systems that had the potential to wreck the company. I don't know if that counts, in your book.
My own home security is merely adequate. I turn off things like upnp on the router. Disks and backups are encrypted. I don't worry overly much about it. If someone actually targets me it's probably game over, but it's ok against random script kiddies or someone stealing my computers.
So you think this isn't the case with home users? Maybe I still misunderstand the point that is being made here, but from my perspective it's only a matter of time until my encrypted password store gets exposed to the local attacker (as soon as I unlock it).
So that default browser behaviour creates a risk that a business should acknowledge and assess.
A home user can of course also decide it's too risky, or that password managers are too risky and only a yubikey will do.
If your point is that password managers aren't a total solution to the issue, I'd agree.
If the user's passwords to the rest of the corporate systems are sitting unprotected in a browser password store, it is a gold mine.
Yes, they should have 2fa and single sign on and so on, but many places don't. The article isn't terrible, it's just pointing out something in browsers that works ok for home users but puts businesses at some risk.