I see how your response makes sense in terms of questions like "why does an electron exist", but what about the general notion of existence? It seems self-evident that there is something, even just experience. I interpreted the question as more "why something rather than nothing" which seems coherent.

I don't really follow. I interpret "there is" and "something" as quantifications, not predicates. What would be the predicate here?

The general notion of existence, at least in natural language, seems to be a shorthand for quantification or negation. I'm not sure what it would mean for "existence" to exist, short of adopting Platonism or some bizarre metaphysical system.

The "something rather than nothing" question, if stated coherently, would likely be beyond the scope of human knowledge. Although ultimately I don't think it can be stated in a way that makes sense.

Experience exists. Whether the contents of the experience are "real" or "not real", it is not coherent to claim that there is truly nothing at all -- what could even cause one to come to that conclusion if there's nothing at all? Platonism is one of the few (only?) games in town in terms of potential ability to furnish answers here (a Popperian scientific method has well-defined boundaries on the scope of explanatory power) -- and the more indications we get that physics can be derived from number theory and combinatorics, the more seriously I think it will be taken as a research topic. A more formally developed Platonism would also potentially be able to address the "something rather than nothing" question.

Why do you think "something rather than nothing" question doesn't make sense?

Well, I can't engage "Experience exists" because I don't treat "exists" as a predicate, as I stated earlier. What you seem to be asserting as straightforwardly true looks to me more like a malformed sentence. Yes, words and concepts arise in our language and are metaphysically constrained by reality. However, it seems to be quite a departure from this milquetoast linguistic fact to assume that natural language would, could, or even should map to the structure of reality—especially with respect to heavyweight "existence" claims—in any meaningful way.

I adopt ontological anti-realism and do not stray into "existence" claims because they simply raise too many methodological issues. The quotes here are important because I don't have an intuitive understanding of what people mean when they say "exists" in the first place.

You could rephrase "Experience exists" as "Humans experience" or "I experience," which is analogous to Cogito in Cogito, ergo sum but without the ergo sum. There's a subject and a predicate already, and "exists" adds nothing.

If you want to make substantive claims about what does or doesn't exist, your views are subject to relatively straightforward reductio ad absurdums. This is demonstrated pretty clearly in On What There Is.

> Why do you think "something rather than nothing" question doesn't make sense?

"Something" = quantifier, "nothing" = quantifier, existential "is" = quantifier. Again, I would insist on a predicate here.

"Metaphysical realism is the thesis that the objects, properties and relations the world contains, collectively: the structure of the world [Sider 2011], exists independently of our thoughts about it or our perceptions of it."

This is _necessarily_ true, to believe otherwise is to make an absurdist claim that humans are somehow special. It's "the earth is the center of the universe" all over again.

Of course, you could always take the truly absurd way out, and claim that _you_ are what is special, and everything else is mere simulacrum for you by you. By all means, admit to this.

Carnap and Quine both argue that treating metaphysical "existence" as a predicate leads to a number of problems. In particular, they argue that it is not possible to know what exists independently of our own perceptions and experiences. This means that any claims about the existence of things beyond our own experience are necessarily speculative and cannot be known for certain.