> I discovered wall and write at some point and was amazed how stupid that was.
write(1) strips escape characters out, and wall(1) represents them as ^[; they protect your terminal against this particular vulnerability since last millennium. wall also escapes bytes above 126, which would be a pain if you weren't speaking English, and write seems to strip at least byte 0x9b, although I don't know if I have a terminal handy that responds to 0x9b.
> The most common concerning use case I think is SSHing into something. There's no way to tell if you got out.
The easiest way to be sure you got out is to close the terminal emulator, but an alternative is just closing ssh, using ^M~. It's possible to flub that by, say, accidentally typing ^M`. or ^M~,. I agree that better UI would help.
A different problem with ssh is that it leaks your keystroke timing to passive listeners who don't have the session key. This isn't a concern for using ssh with password authentication but it is a concern if you're running sudo or gpg on the server you sshed into.
I agree that unrestricted sudo isn't an effective defense against malware, just against accidentally hosing your system.
I discovered wall and write at some point and was amazed how stupid that was. At some point some distros started getting rid of them but I gave up trying to understand UN*X long before that point as it was clearly a joke OS.
> This could matter if you use "sudo".
The most common concerning use case I think is SSHing into something. There's no way to tell if you got out. This perhaps has limited exploitability, but still should not be a thing, and is easily solved with a real UI instead of terminal hacks. Sudo is usually only used to run stuff as root - under the pretense that requiring this will somehow stop malware from getting root - which itself is a misconception (which indeed capability based systems avoid).
>You might want to remove your complaints about downvotes and boasts of rationality so people don't downvote you for them.
Nah it's funny.