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Re:Linux RNG RFC Patch: implement getrandom() in vDSO by barsonme on Friday July 29, 2022 @07:00PM (#32282661)
And some standards (like Common Criteria) actually require you to bring your own FIPS-validated CSPRNG, which effectively makes a userspace CSPRNG unavoidable.

I wasn't aware that FIPS required your _entropy source_ to be validated in order for your library to be validated, though. BoringSSL, for example, just reads from RDRAND, getrandom(2), or /dev/urandom. Maybe the OS/CPUs it's certified for all have FIPS-validated entropy sources?

Re:Linux RNG RFC Patch: implement getrandom() in vDSO by cipherboy on Friday July 29, 2022 @07:22PM (#32282807)
Correct; after the newer seeding policies have taken affect, many have punted to the OS/app for seeding. See https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-modu... -- the entropy input is plaintext via API, but still needs to be from an approved source via 90B I believe, so likely means their Android kernel is also certified or they maintain something like JitterEntropy for that.

The older e.g., 36xx series Google cert predates that requirement iirc, when you could seed from a non-FIPS kernel.

Re:Linux RNG RFC Patch: implement getrandom() in vDSO by barsonme on Saturday July 30, 2022 @11:58AM (#32287784)
Thanks. This explains the Common Criteria entropy assessment.