- Worked at Sony Entertainment, handling the software side of things, was there to help for the massive fuckup that was the PS3 launch.
- Got fired (or "resigned" in C-level speak), joined Infogrames (soon to become Atari) and majorly fucked up, saying that single player games would become increasingly rare as well as contributing to running the company into the ground while taking massive dividends.
- Got fired from Atari and joins Gaikai (another game live streaming service that failed miserably and was picked up later by Sony for Playstation Now).
- (Most likely got fired from Gaikai, but no news from this anywhere) and joins Microsoft, just in time to utterly fuck up the Xbox One launch and making the branch he was a director of produce... absolutely fuck all ?
- Got fired from Microsoft and gets named vice president at Google, before heading the Stadia team as a product manager, utterly fucking up its launch, closing down Stadia Games and Studios (that actually managed to build up a pretty talented team), and soon, closing down Stadia.
This clown just gets paid to fail. He's got the reverse Midas touch, short anything he touches.
>PS3
performed extremely well, beating Xbox 360 by a fairly thin margin.
>Gaikai
sold for $380M USD to Sony (most people consider this a success, even if you think it should have been more.)
>Xbox One
lost to the PS4 by a factor of two but was still successful (50 million est. lifetime sales)
Even if every single thing he was in charge of failed catastrophically, anyone who isn't looking closely is going to see someone with a huge amount of industry expertise working on some of the largest and most successful products to ever exist full stop (not just in gaming.)
Everything you mentioned has gotten successful both late in its existence, and very much after Harrison left.
Phil Harrison is an absolute tool though.
I think people ascribe way too much agency to corporate executives.
I'm not sure this was an 'obvious failure of execution'. They wanted to build a gaming cloud-streaming-only service, and they built one. I don't think you can build a better one because the problems with cloud-streamed gaming are with the concept not execution. The streaming service provided by Xbox is on par with Stadia, in that it suffers from the same latency, and graphical downscaling issues as Stadia did. On the Xbox it is part of my subscription (so technically 'free') and I don't want to use it because the experience is bad (although it is nice to quickly sample a game without needing to wait for download and install).
But then they muddied things up with Stadia Pro, making people think it was actually supposed to a "Netflix for games" subscription service, and crucially making Stadia Pro the only SKU for a very long time. So rather than the really appealing entry point to console gaming that people could have easily tried, they ended up targeting the exact people for whom Stadia was the worst fit (hardcore gamers with existing console owners and large game libraries).
How to fund the development of a risky but long-term valuable new platform? Whomever was calling the shots on that question failed spectacularly and in a way that technology companies usually don't. You're already losing hundreds of millions making the tech, why not spend a few more loss-leading the user growth?
And it's not just that, because Google's reputation for giving up on anything remotely difficult, no one bought into it in the first place. I would wager there are entire market segments that Google can just never enter now since they have done such a good job at branding themselves unreliable. It reminds me of a Petrostate where a country has huge wealth because of what they're sitting on, but that same wealth destroys their ability to develop anything meaningfully different.