This isn’t a fun theoretical exercise. In the public sphere, “science” tends to get invoked with dispositive weight. And it should in many cases. But for that to work, “science” must meet the level of rigor people associate with “science.” To be called “science” it should be like physics in terms of providing truth value, not psychology.
Aristotle didn’t do “science.” He was a philosopher. His ideas were precursors to science, but weren’t science.
It's possible to form a truth about human behavior, for example, I did X because Y. If someone points my behavior out to me, then in the future I may do Z in response to Y. Human behavior can change upon observation [1]. That doesn't make the study of human behavior "not science" in my opinion.
> Aristotle didn’t do “science.” He was a philosopher. His ideas were precursors to science, but weren’t science.
In that case, I suppose you will acknowledge that Galileo did science, despite not having a lot of data points. I think Aristotle did too, because I draw the line at hypothesis, observation and conclusion, which may or may not result in some ultimate truth that remains constant.
I suppose you would also say that the double slit test is science. Yet that result changes, and there is no truth value that we can explain, except by noting that the result changes when the experiment is observed.
It might be valuable and it might be worthwhile to do. But what you describe in itself is not science.
Given the definition, why wouldn't you consider observing human behavior to be science?
It seems unlikely that all of social science will one day be declared as "not science". Aristotle's methods, for example, did not require a certain sample size.
You're applying far too strict of a definition to science. Basic forms of science can be practiced by a child at home. Journals publish more in-depth analyses, and it's up to them what to publish, at the risk or reward of gains and losses of readership.
[1] https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/is-social-s...