"In one experimental condition, subjects were told that the group from which the descriptions had been drawn consisted of 70 engineers and 30 lawyers. In another condition subjects were told that the group consisted of 30 engineers and 70 lawyerss. [..] In sharp violation of Bayes' rule, the subjects in the two conditions produced essentially the same probability judgements."
There is also a blatant error in the OP article: Answer No. 2 (Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.) is by no means "logically impossible".
EDIT: wording
They meant that it's logically impossible for the probability of A AND B to be higher than the probability of A, since A AND B is a subset of A. She could be feminist, but the probability of being feminist is lower than the 100% probability that she's either a feminist or not.
Overall, I find it rather ironic to find such gross errors in an article that sets out to educate the reader about "human error".
Then they went around asking people the same question:
Which alternative is more probable?
(1) Linda is a bank teller.
(2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
The vast majority—roughly 85 percent—of the people they asked opted for No. 2, even though No. 2 is logically impossible. (If No. 2 is true, so is No. 1.)
They say: "If No. 2 is true, so is No. 1.", but they omit that the opposite does not hold. Perhaps they thought it was obvious enough.
I think they get it and just left that second part out. They may have worded it poorly (better would be "it is logically impossible that #2 could be the correct answer"), but it was very clear to me when reading the article that the editors meant exactly what you describe.
Now that I think about this one, I think maybe the probability really is 30%. They don't say how they selected the lawyers and engineers. Maybe they selected patent lawyers (required to have engineering degrees) and all 70 members of the Society of Women Locomotive Engineers. Maybe they selected people at random. We don't know. Since we don't know the priors, we can't apply any reasoning about any characteristics of Jack.
In fact, they didn't say how they selected Jack either. Maybe they picked him out just to humiliate quiz takers who don't know the PI is a sadist.
This is a classic case of abusing the student by proving trick questions without essential information.
They didn't give conditional probabilities but of course we can, and should, use what we know about the world to make guesses at P(E|'likes math'), or at least whether that's greater than P(L|'likes math'). It surely is and you can do something similar with carpentry and an apolitical nature.
It's true that even with the assumptions I've given above you can't come up with a precise answer - none of the choices are any good - you can certainly say that "...the correct response being precisely 30 percent" is thoroughly wrong.
"A team of psychologists performed personality tests on 100 professionals, of which 30 were engineers and 70 were lawyers. Brief descriptions were written for each subject. The following is a sample of one of the resulting descriptions:
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social issues and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies, which include home carpentry, sailing, and mathematics.
What is the probability that Jack is one of the 30 engineers?"
The answer given is that the probability is exactly 30%, since there are 30 engineers out of 100. But this ignores all of the information available in the description! Imagine if the description said "Jack's hobbies include writing compilers, hacking assembly code, World of Warcraft, designing new programming languages and LARP." Would we still conclude that there's only a 30% chance of him being an engineer?
A correct answer to this question should apply Bayes' rule. With E representing 'Jack is an engineer', L representing 'Jack is a lawyer' and D representing the description, Bayes rule tells us
P(E|D) = P(E) P(D|E) / P(D)
P(L|D) = P(L) P(D|L) / P(D)
where P(A|B) is 'the probability of A given B' and P(A) is 'the probability of A without taking other information into account'. We can ignore the common factor of 1/P(D) and we know that P(E)=0.3 and P(L)=0.7, so the relative probabilities of Jack being an engineer or a lawyer, given the description of him, are
P(E|D) ~ 0.3 * P(D|E)
P(L|D) ~ 0.7 * P(D|L)
so the a priori probabilities of Jack being an engineer or a lawyer need to be weighted by the probability of seeing the description that we did, given that Jack is an engineer or a lawyer! If you claim that there is a 70% chance of seeing the description if Jack is an engineer but only 30% if Jack is a lawyer, then taking all the evidence into account, you should ascribe an equal probability to the two possibilities.
Basic probability fail by the editors of Vanity Fair, I think.
[1] http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/12/kahneman...