It's important to understand the scope of the issue. If you create and operate on your own symlinks in your own folders, there is no problem. The problem is when a more privileged user operates on folders that can be written to by less privileged users, for example system daemons (like a /tmp cleanup, or a web server serving /home/*/www), or suid binaries. These things need to be written very carefully, it is now clear.
But if I'm working with my own files, media, source code, build tools, web pages, etc, in my own folders, then symlinks are still fine.
And there is an existing setting to mitigate a couple common forms of the issue that does exist when accessing folders other users can write to: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/sysctl/fs...
The problem is that there is such a huge number of tools in widespread use that each one causing even a few security vulnerabilities means that the ecosystem overall is constantly vulnerable
Could we consider it a broken doorknob Pierce?
Or, more like, if there's an attacker hiding in your house, while you're setting up the shoelace door thing for some odd reason, they could slam the door on your fingers. Oh no, how were we ever allowed to have doors, so criminally unsafe.
When I'm exposed to a core OS feature I expect by default that it should not come with expected, critical security vulnerabilities. It is rational to expect a user to use the basic features of an OS and expect them not to cause severe issues. You can say it's not broken, and that's true in as much as they're still functional, but if by broken one means the larger question of "is this reliable and safe?" then I think the answer is pretty clear that symlinks are broken.