One suggestion I might add, it would be worth trying to compile any of OpenBSD's privilege separated network daemons on Linux (w/ Cosmopolitan Libc, or others). While you may have intended to use this facility primarily for your own APE Binaries, I suspect you'll find that the despite your intentions to make this compatible with the C API definition of pledge(2), in practice, your implementation is incompatible with privsep/privdrop software, for which pledge was designed. It was never intended for application "sandboxing".
BPF programs attached to syscalls (via kprobe or fentry) can read arguments via helpers (bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}). Seccomp uses "classic BPF" which has no concept of helpers or calls.
I guess landlock can't help you here since it is still mostly about filesystem access right now, but maybe someday? It looks like "minimal network access control" is on the long term roadmap: https://landlock.io/
I noticed that you're missing the sendfd promise. Is there a reason for that omission? Also you've added a number of extensions that perhaps should be documented as such.
Also there's a pretty significant undocumented difference between your implementation and OpenBSD, in that promises are by inherited across exec in yours, and not on OpenBSD.
OpenBSD experimented with that by specifying the second argument as execpromises, but discovered that it was extremely difficult if not impossible to write meaningful execpromises in the parent for potentially unrelated programs, it's also happening too early before dynamic linking, and before the program has had an opportunity to "initialize" or "do privileged stuff" and call pledge(2) later itself with more accurate knowledge of what to self-restrict. As such, no calls with execpromises set to anything but NULL/0 exist today. I'm curious how to reconcile those differences.