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Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by jeroenhd on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @07:38AM (#32068401)
Allowing the Linux bootloader is a security risk for consumer Windows devices. Microsoft foolishly doesn't enable Bitlocker on them, so the excellent rootkit protection secure boot provides gets wiped out entirely the moment you grab a copy of grub with your own chain loader. This is possible because a vulnerable version of Grub got signed at some point that allows loading unsigned code.

Secure boot should always be possible to turn off, and it should always be possible to load your own keys. I don't see the point of keeping it enabled on Linux if all of its protection can be disabled by editing a file on /boot. It defeats the entire point of requiring higher-than-kernel level permissions to alter the boot sequence.

Linux needs better secure boot key management features if it's serious about making secure boot work. Without it, just turn it off. It's a bit of a pain for new Linux users, but so is every other step of the way.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by AshamedCaptain on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @08:07AM (#32068669)
> for consumer Windows devices. Microsoft foolishly doesn't enable Bitlocker on them

Actually, Microsoft enables Bitlocker on many if not most consumer devices. For example, I have not been able to find a laptop without Bitlocker enabled by default since the Windows 8.1 era. Even home editions of Windows enable bitlocker by default, even if they don't call it Bitlocker (they call it "Full device encryption" or the like). On desktops the situation is the opposite -- until recently, most desktops didn't even ship with a TPM at all.

Nowadays TPMs are a requirement for Windows 11, so devices with Bitlocker disabled by default are going to be a minority.

> I don't see the point of keeping it enabled on Linux if all of its protection can be disabled by editing a file on /boot.

That's not true -- if a distribution is shipping a signed bootloader binary, then there should be no way to use that distribution's bootloader to run an unsigned binary. In fact, it would be considered a security vulnerability and the corresponding bootloader binaries would be blacklisted by Microsoft. It has happened in the past: https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000019892 . The default behavior of most distribution's GRUB2 (and specially whenever it is pre-enrolled into a signed shim) is that when you boot under Secure Boot it will check the signature on any UEFI executable, GRUB module, or Linux kernel you try to boot, and refuse to boot if it is not in the (UEFI firmware/shim) whitelist.

> Linux needs better secure boot key management features if it's serious about making secure boot work.

Linux already has multiple secure boot key management facilities. And then there's shim.

But in any case, the problem is that Microsoft itself should be required to face these problems; under no circumstance should it be that by default MS gets their signatures to work for free but everyone else needs to have extra UI to manage them.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by vladvasiliu on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @08:58AM (#32069196)
> I have not been able to find a laptop without Bitlocker enabled by default since the Windows 8.1 era

We use HP Pro/Elite Desk/Book at work. They arrive with Windows 10 Pro and with BitLocker disabled. They have had a TPM and everything for many years, now. Latest such PC I've seen was manufactured in February 2022 (Elitebook 840 G8).

> But in any case, the problem is that Microsoft itself should be required to face these problems; under no circumstance should it be that by default MS gets their signatures to work for free but everyone else needs to have extra UI to manage them.

The thing is that if the PC comes with Windows pre-installed, then the certificates should be enrolled. But if not, maybe there shouldn't be any certificate? I guess my point is that it's unreasonable to expect a manufacturer to ship a computer with a bunch of certificates. I'd even say that it wouldn't be that secure.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by bobkazamakis on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @09:18AM (#32069478)
> I guess my point is that it's unreasonable to expect a manufacturer to ship a computer with a bunch of certificates. I'd even say that it wouldn't be that secure.

How exactly do you think a root trust should be established? Should it just boot up and start grabbing whatever certificates it thinks might be authentic over the network?

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by vladvasiliu on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @09:27AM (#32069576)
Of course not.

But the issue is that if there's a "root" certificate installed, then we're more or less in the current situation, where MS has that root certificate and anyone else who wants to have a bootloader must get it signed by MS.

Sure, there could be some kind of "neutral" entity in charge of this, but the issue remains.

Then there's also the issue of managing certificate revocations. Don't know how that works, currently. Maybe via firmware updates? But then, older computers are SoL.

Instead, what I think should be done, is to improve the workflow and documentation for installing one's own certificates. It's what I do on my own PC to run Arch (whose bootloader is not signed by MS) and I also signed MS's certificates so I can dual-boot. But the whole process is somewhat involved, it's not a simple "click a few buttons and you're done" kind of deal.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by mjg59 on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @10:12AM (#32070250)
>Then there's also the issue of managing certificate revocations.

Revocation updates are in the form of authenticated UEFI variable blobs. They can be applied regardless of OS and don't require a firmware update.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by admax88qqq on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @10:40AM (#32070666)
Ship with no certificates, and Trust on First Use the certificate of whatever OS is installed first.

There fixed it.

No extra hoops for any OS. Extra hoops if you wish to change OS, which could increase security>

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by AshamedCaptain on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @09:27AM (#32069577)
I am precisely typing this from an store-bought HP Elite laptop from 2017 (!) and it definitely came with Bitlocker enabled. In fact, HP explicitly says that all their laptops with modern standby (which again is most of them, and explicitly the Elitebook 840) come with Bitlocker on !! https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/c06458046

You could have said Acer or some other lesser-known brand and I would have not been able to counter, but HP? Are you sure "work" didn't configure Bitlocker to be disabled ?

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by vladvasiliu on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @09:34AM (#32069674)
> Are you sure "work" didn't configure Bitlocker to be disabled ?

Absolutely. I took the PC out of the box myself ("I am work") and I know we don't have our supplier do anything to the PCs before they send them to us, because we remaster them first thing.

My PC didn't go through that process because it's not one of the models everyone else uses and I don't use Windows.

---

edit: there's talk on a page referenced by your link about "Device Encryption" (as opposed to Drive encryption) which is activated when the PC is joined to a domain. This did actually happen, but out of the box the drive was not encrypted. The reason I know is because I went to enable regular Bitlocker but then stopped because I didn't have a separate drive on hand to save the recovery key.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by AshamedCaptain on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @09:55AM (#32069987)
> there's talk on a page referenced by your link about "Device Encryption" (as opposed to Drive encryption) which is activated when the PC is joined to a domain.

Device encryption, disk encryption, and Bitlocker are actually the same thing. The reason is that Windows Home doesn't have "Bitlocker" which means it can't do external (aka non-boot) disk encryption, so they call the resulting feature "Device encryption", but it's still Bitlocker.

My only guess is that you didn't login with a Microsoft account, since it is a requirement and "you don't use Windows". But obviously, the majority of people do login with a Microsoft account, and judging from HP's own support page plus the amount of people I can google claiming to have lost their recovery keys on the same laptop model you have ... I'm quite sure it is enabled by default.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by vladvasiliu on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @10:06AM (#32070151)
> My only guess is that you didn't login with a Microsoft account

That's correct, I created a local-only account since the PC wasn't connected to any network.

However, I would have expected a feature "enabled by default" to not be tied to a specific type of account. I suppose that it would have to save the key somewhere, which works less well with local accounts.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by AshamedCaptain on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @10:23AM (#32070401)
MS accounts are mandatory for all home editions of Windows, and likely soon to be for everything that's not an enterprise edition.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by kingrazor on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @04:16PM (#32075069)
Many business class PCs shipping with Pro versions of Windows do not have bitlocker enabled by default. We have a few hundred laptops and desktops in the validation lab I work in and very few of them shipped with bitlocker enabled.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by AshamedCaptain on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @04:19PM (#32075110)
Name a laptop model and we'll check. But do check the other thread too, I think you'd be surprised. I was surprised too -- it is practically guaranteed that on a laptop with a TPM and modern standby, Bitlocker will be enabled by default. In fact, a Windows install will default to on, ignoring the OEM setting.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by kingrazor on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @04:35PM (#32075307)
I can't speak to anything newer than comet lake, but between my various HP elite books, elite desks, Dell optiplexes, latitudes, and Lenovo thinkpads, very few of them have shipped with bitlocker enabled by default.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by AshamedCaptain on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @04:48PM (#32075472)
As I mention on the other thread, I could believe Asus or Acer or some other cheap laptop disabling it because of gaming performance or whatever, but not the big brands.

I am quite familiar with HP itself, and in fact as I linked on the other thread they publicly claim that _all_ their laptops have Bitlocker enabled by default. Lenovo is the laptop of TFA, so they are definitely doing Bitlocker on their enterprisey laptops. My Dell Inspiron 5510 came with Bitlocker on out of the box, and perusing the Dell support site having articles about Bitlocker recovery as early as the WD15 docking station era, I am sure they are enabling it by default too.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by kingrazor on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @05:10PM (#32075737)
I don't know what to tell you. Only going off my own experience. Maybe things have changed since Kaby Lake. Most of my systems are Kaby Lake or older. I only have the one comet lake Dell and at this point can't actually recall how it shipped since I've reinstalled the OS several times at this point.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by AshamedCaptain on Wednesday July 13, 2022 @10:29AM (#32083257)
For the record, Windows itself defaults to Bitlocker on, irregardless of OEM defaults, as long as the hardware has a TPM and modern standby.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by kingrazor on Friday July 15, 2022 @07:55PM (#32114001)
Odd then that I've only in 1 out of a few hundred cases ever had to disable it after install in order to not have it run.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by ho_schi on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @08:36AM (#32068941)
Turn SecureBoot off. Secure the UEFI and harddrive itself!

Requirements

State of he art UEFI implementation and usually a harddrive from the professional series. In case of a ThinkPad it should be possible for more than a decade.

How To

   1.) Set an UEFI-Password to protect the UEFI (formerly BIOS) itself
   2.) Set a Harddrive-Password within the UEFI, which requires a harddrive with built-in encryption

This protects the UEFI itself from manipulation, the bootloader, the kernel and the howl system. It is simple, therefore less error prone. Transparent to the operating-system, therefore any operating system is supported. It doesn't affect performance because professional harddrives actually encrypt always all data - they just don't ask for a key. You need to trust into the UEFI implementation and the harddrive manufacturer, which you hopefully do.

Bonus

No Certificate Authority (CA) and certificates involved. This reduces the error surface because it is error prone. You could even add LUKS (or whatever you prefer) on top of it. Because of the transparent built-in encryption you will not have a conflict. Probably a touch too much? But upon your decision.

https://support.lenovo.com/ie/en/solutions/ht002240

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by tentacleuno on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @08:50AM (#32069108)
> You need to trust into the UEFI implementation and the harddrive manufacturer, which you hopefully do.

Trusting hardware encryption on consumer SSD's has been proven to be a pretty disastrous idea[0], with even Bitlocker disabling hardware encryption by default.

From what I understand, a lot of encryption implementations were really really bad, with massive security vulnerabilities and issues. I suppose if you're an enterprise you have the money to test if the SSD is actually encrypting the data on the NAND, but a consumer would be none the wiser.

[0]: https://www.howtogeek.com/fyi/you-cant-trust-bitlocker-to-en...

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by ho_schi on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @10:26AM (#32070443)
Yes. I just didn't remember the specific models affeced:

    Crucial: MX100, MX200 und MX300
    Samsung: 840 EVO und 850 EVO
Curcial fixed it later with an firmware update. I think people got mad on Samsung because they didn't fixed it? Not affected where Intel, Micron, Samsung's own more expensive PRO-Series (interesting?) and others. We also rely on hardware based encryption on iPhones and Androids? Finally we need to trust the CPU and the random number generator, TPM, Pluton and that the keyboard or whatever is not manipulated. By the way - I don't trust Microsoft's Pluton! And interestingly Dell and Lenovo decided to turn it off by default.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by tentacleuno on Monday July 18, 2022 @10:13AM (#32138623)
> By the way - I don't trust Microsoft's Pluton!

I have to admit that I have hope for Pluton: it seems like it's going to increase the security of computing, which would obviously be beneficial to all of us. What they're talking about isn't exactly a new concept (I believe Apple call their the Secure Enclave) but it's one of those "Why didn't we have this already things?" where PC's just feel a bit behind.

Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by mjg59 on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @10:11AM (#32070217)
The devices we're talking about here all have Bitlocker enabled by default.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by jeroenhd on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @12:08PM (#32071962)
I didn't know that, that's very nice. I appreciate that Microsoft is finally moving forward with offering encryption by default.
Re:Responsible stewardship of the UEFI Secure Boot ecosystem by NotEvil on Tuesday July 12, 2022 @08:34AM (#32068919)
You might wanna read the article. It argues the very point you are making.