Actually, Microsoft enables Bitlocker on many if not most consumer devices. For example, I have not been able to find a laptop without Bitlocker enabled by default since the Windows 8.1 era. Even home editions of Windows enable bitlocker by default, even if they don't call it Bitlocker (they call it "Full device encryption" or the like). On desktops the situation is the opposite -- until recently, most desktops didn't even ship with a TPM at all.
Nowadays TPMs are a requirement for Windows 11, so devices with Bitlocker disabled by default are going to be a minority.
> I don't see the point of keeping it enabled on Linux if all of its protection can be disabled by editing a file on /boot.
That's not true -- if a distribution is shipping a signed bootloader binary, then there should be no way to use that distribution's bootloader to run an unsigned binary. In fact, it would be considered a security vulnerability and the corresponding bootloader binaries would be blacklisted by Microsoft. It has happened in the past: https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000019892 . The default behavior of most distribution's GRUB2 (and specially whenever it is pre-enrolled into a signed shim) is that when you boot under Secure Boot it will check the signature on any UEFI executable, GRUB module, or Linux kernel you try to boot, and refuse to boot if it is not in the (UEFI firmware/shim) whitelist.
> Linux needs better secure boot key management features if it's serious about making secure boot work.
Linux already has multiple secure boot key management facilities. And then there's shim.
But in any case, the problem is that Microsoft itself should be required to face these problems; under no circumstance should it be that by default MS gets their signatures to work for free but everyone else needs to have extra UI to manage them.
We use HP Pro/Elite Desk/Book at work. They arrive with Windows 10 Pro and with BitLocker disabled. They have had a TPM and everything for many years, now. Latest such PC I've seen was manufactured in February 2022 (Elitebook 840 G8).
> But in any case, the problem is that Microsoft itself should be required to face these problems; under no circumstance should it be that by default MS gets their signatures to work for free but everyone else needs to have extra UI to manage them.
The thing is that if the PC comes with Windows pre-installed, then the certificates should be enrolled. But if not, maybe there shouldn't be any certificate? I guess my point is that it's unreasonable to expect a manufacturer to ship a computer with a bunch of certificates. I'd even say that it wouldn't be that secure.
How exactly do you think a root trust should be established? Should it just boot up and start grabbing whatever certificates it thinks might be authentic over the network?
But the issue is that if there's a "root" certificate installed, then we're more or less in the current situation, where MS has that root certificate and anyone else who wants to have a bootloader must get it signed by MS.
Sure, there could be some kind of "neutral" entity in charge of this, but the issue remains.
Then there's also the issue of managing certificate revocations. Don't know how that works, currently. Maybe via firmware updates? But then, older computers are SoL.
Instead, what I think should be done, is to improve the workflow and documentation for installing one's own certificates. It's what I do on my own PC to run Arch (whose bootloader is not signed by MS) and I also signed MS's certificates so I can dual-boot. But the whole process is somewhat involved, it's not a simple "click a few buttons and you're done" kind of deal.
Revocation updates are in the form of authenticated UEFI variable blobs. They can be applied regardless of OS and don't require a firmware update.
There fixed it.
No extra hoops for any OS. Extra hoops if you wish to change OS, which could increase security>
You could have said Acer or some other lesser-known brand and I would have not been able to counter, but HP? Are you sure "work" didn't configure Bitlocker to be disabled ?
Absolutely. I took the PC out of the box myself ("I am work") and I know we don't have our supplier do anything to the PCs before they send them to us, because we remaster them first thing.
My PC didn't go through that process because it's not one of the models everyone else uses and I don't use Windows.
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edit: there's talk on a page referenced by your link about "Device Encryption" (as opposed to Drive encryption) which is activated when the PC is joined to a domain. This did actually happen, but out of the box the drive was not encrypted. The reason I know is because I went to enable regular Bitlocker but then stopped because I didn't have a separate drive on hand to save the recovery key.
Device encryption, disk encryption, and Bitlocker are actually the same thing. The reason is that Windows Home doesn't have "Bitlocker" which means it can't do external (aka non-boot) disk encryption, so they call the resulting feature "Device encryption", but it's still Bitlocker.
My only guess is that you didn't login with a Microsoft account, since it is a requirement and "you don't use Windows". But obviously, the majority of people do login with a Microsoft account, and judging from HP's own support page plus the amount of people I can google claiming to have lost their recovery keys on the same laptop model you have ... I'm quite sure it is enabled by default.
That's correct, I created a local-only account since the PC wasn't connected to any network.
However, I would have expected a feature "enabled by default" to not be tied to a specific type of account. I suppose that it would have to save the key somewhere, which works less well with local accounts.
I am quite familiar with HP itself, and in fact as I linked on the other thread they publicly claim that _all_ their laptops have Bitlocker enabled by default. Lenovo is the laptop of TFA, so they are definitely doing Bitlocker on their enterprisey laptops. My Dell Inspiron 5510 came with Bitlocker on out of the box, and perusing the Dell support site having articles about Bitlocker recovery as early as the WD15 docking station era, I am sure they are enabling it by default too.
Requirements
State of he art UEFI implementation and usually a harddrive from the professional series. In case of a ThinkPad it should be possible for more than a decade.
How To
1.) Set an UEFI-Password to protect the UEFI (formerly BIOS) itself
2.) Set a Harddrive-Password within the UEFI, which requires a harddrive with built-in encryption
This protects the UEFI itself from manipulation, the bootloader, the kernel and the howl system. It is simple, therefore less error prone. Transparent to the operating-system, therefore any operating system is supported. It doesn't affect performance because professional harddrives actually encrypt always all data - they just don't ask for a key. You need to trust into the UEFI implementation and the harddrive manufacturer, which you hopefully do.Bonus
No Certificate Authority (CA) and certificates involved. This reduces the error surface because it is error prone. You could even add LUKS (or whatever you prefer) on top of it. Because of the transparent built-in encryption you will not have a conflict. Probably a touch too much? But upon your decision.
Trusting hardware encryption on consumer SSD's has been proven to be a pretty disastrous idea[0], with even Bitlocker disabling hardware encryption by default.
From what I understand, a lot of encryption implementations were really really bad, with massive security vulnerabilities and issues. I suppose if you're an enterprise you have the money to test if the SSD is actually encrypting the data on the NAND, but a consumer would be none the wiser.
[0]: https://www.howtogeek.com/fyi/you-cant-trust-bitlocker-to-en...
Crucial: MX100, MX200 und MX300
Samsung: 840 EVO und 850 EVO
Curcial fixed it later with an firmware update. I think people got mad on Samsung because they didn't fixed it? Not affected where Intel, Micron, Samsung's own more expensive PRO-Series (interesting?) and others. We also rely on hardware based encryption on iPhones and Androids? Finally we need to trust the CPU and the random number generator, TPM, Pluton and that the keyboard or whatever is not manipulated. By the way - I don't trust Microsoft's Pluton! And interestingly Dell and Lenovo decided to turn it off by default.I have to admit that I have hope for Pluton: it seems like it's going to increase the security of computing, which would obviously be beneficial to all of us. What they're talking about isn't exactly a new concept (I believe Apple call their the Secure Enclave) but it's one of those "Why didn't we have this already things?" where PC's just feel a bit behind.
Secure boot should always be possible to turn off, and it should always be possible to load your own keys. I don't see the point of keeping it enabled on Linux if all of its protection can be disabled by editing a file on /boot. It defeats the entire point of requiring higher-than-kernel level permissions to alter the boot sequence.
Linux needs better secure boot key management features if it's serious about making secure boot work. Without it, just turn it off. It's a bit of a pain for new Linux users, but so is every other step of the way.