You may enjoy the following cartoon (20 Jan 2022) from Zemgus Zaharans from Riga - I literally just met it:
https://cartoonmovement.com/cartoon/germany-and-russia
Which by the way is about having kept the stance until the last moment.
An intention spelt out in textbooks?! Quite an understatement.
Q: "So the part had been expressing an explicit, literal intention, public, codified, written, divulgated, explained et cetera?" // A: "...Heart, Hope, Daily routine, Expectation, Being alike..."
You are defending a perspective of intentional removal of reality, and the principle of reality constraint, from conscience.
> You can't really blame... for doing their best on making a war unthinkable through
In that '«unthinkable»' you show the whole point. It was very much duly thinkable.
Surely those who overrode reality, and in favour of illusion, and clinging unprepared in a cage of "que será", are to blame, and to blame, and to blame.
I don't even agree in 'hindsight' this situation was obvious. It's a hugely risky and crazy manoeuvre by Putin that may very well be his undoing.
The Russian economy is starting to crack, vast elements of key industrial sectors are collapsing.
There are no good cars being made in Russia, and even their garbage Lada's, which nobody wants, might not get made due to sanctions.
Car sales have dropped 80%, there's a vicious black market for spare parts.
Most Russians drive foreign cars. What happens when the all need parts?
Russian airline fleets cannot get maintenance or parts. They are being grounded.
Nothing about this invasion is obvious or doctrinal.
Entirely a surprise? Maybe not - but certainly not expected by anyone, even those paying attention.
Illogical. You could do your own research. Hint, anyway: some material was found as "most interesting" by investigative journalism after Brexit.
Likewise,
> Nothing about this invasion is obvious or doctrinal
is a fully irrational statement.
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About the substantive part of your post: you are committing the error of confusing reasoning, under subjective value assumptions, as a ground for prediction. You do not go "certainly they would not do that" projecting in others the role of "rational agents" according to criteria you defined for them. Generic actors do not act "like you would", they act like _they_ would.
No, it's not illogical for us to ask you to validate your completely made up, speculative claims that have no basis in reality.
I've already 'done my research'. I know there is nothing 'doctrinal' about Russia's invasion.
You're making claims about other's rhetorical posture (i.e. "you are committing the error of confusing reasoning") - at the same time you're unsubstantiated fantasy statements.
Your claims about 'Russian doctrine' are a bit outrageous and I suggest you might not even know what the term 'doctrine' even means.
I'd be happy to be proven wrong, so again, provide evidence for your wild claims.
Looking forward to it (I really am actually, prove me wrong ...).
(And your logic: I never said it was «illogical to ask». You never even asked.)
"In the days leading up to Russia's February invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin gave a televised address that rejected the idea of Ukraine as an independent country. It never had the 'stable traditions of real statehood,' Putin said. Instead, modern Ukraine was 'entirely created by Russia or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia.'
More than prelude and pretext for a bloody war, Putin's words echo the writings of a man who has proselytized this idea for almost three decades: Aleksandr Dugin. A Russian political philosopher, Dugin has been influential with Russian military and political elites — even with Putin himself."[0]
Dugin's textbook in question, translated from Russian:
"On the key question of Ukraine, Dugin underlines: 'Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has no particular cultural import or universal significance, no geographic uniqueness, no ethnic exclusiveness" (377). 'Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions,' he warns, 'represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is in general senseless to speak about continental politics' (348)"[1]
[0]:https://www.cbsnews.com/news/aleksandr-dugin-russia-ukraine-... [1]:https://web.archive.org/web/20160607175004/https://www2.gwu....
What is relevant are the decision makers - although to the analyst all phenomena are differently relevant, but to reconstruct decision making - and said mention of «teachings [] in textbooks or doctrine» is obscure with regard to the point.
I wrote «It was public doctrine in textbooks, taught at university». I very clearly intended to mean that those doctrines were shown in the open, and that they should have "rung warning bells" together with many other puzzle pieces. Nothing secret, not "documents in safes". And there have been occasions to remind analysts of them.
When the "Ruler formerly known as Mr" (the intention of a change of title was news of the past few hours) took Presidents one by one and clearly spelt out conditions - as they witness -, when doctrine was formulated in clear words and infographics available at your best bookstore (but you can probably attend a lecture), it becomes farcical to act as if Las Vegas had no signs.
If she is wearing a T-shirt, read it: it may contain a message. Otherwise they will complain rightfully you do not listen.
The one chief question about the "book" is how extensive analysts valuated its penetration. Being there, it was there.
War is always unthinkable. Yes, there were warning signs that, in retrospect, were obvious, but Russia invading Ukraine was so profoundly dumb it was difficult to expect for Putin to really go through with it. He did, his country is suffering in result, and he wants to make it mutual, WWI style. You can't really blame Germany for doing their best on making a war unthinkable through economic interdependence.