(I'm among an elite cadre† of cryptography-adjacents who felt it probably wasn't, but only because I thought it was too stupid to actually be used anywhere --- as soon as it was disclosed that (a) it was a default-yes algorithm in BSAFE and (b) big companies actually used BSAFE in important products, it was immediately clear what was going on).
The idea of Dual EC is essentially that your output is internal RNG state encrypted with a public key, leaving open the obvious question of "who has the private key?". I think we all know the answer to that now.
† i am being ironic
I appreciate the point about trust in the authorship of those presenting these algorithms, and I personally do accept it, but there's a lack of trust broadly (in the very community that these standards are intended for) in the process that your comments don't account for in this instance.
Nitpick: strictly speaking, it wasn't plainly a backdoor specifically, but plainly either a backdoor, or something deliberately designed to look backdoored, but with some unknown way for the NSA to 'reluctantly' declassify a proof that it wasn't backdoored in a attempt to discredit people who accused it of being backdoored (basically trying to recreate the DES S-box versus differential cryptanalysis thing). But smart money was on actually-a-backdoor.
https://threatpost.com/nist-drops-weak-dual_ec-rng-from-offi...
It appears that BULLRUN was the name of the effort/program, not the faulty algorithm itself.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_(decryption_program)