But what if I ask YOU right now: "Are YOU experiencing something instead of nothing. Is YOU'RE current experience different from what it would be if YOU were under general anesthesia."
If you're answer to these questions is yes then YOU are experiencing qualia. Of course your answer proves nothing to me or any other third party. But it should prove something to YOU.
It is about the actual experience of being.
If that means nothing to you, I don't think there's anything I can say that would change your mind. In this domain all language can do is evoke recognition for someone who already experiences what is being evoked but doesn't recognize it. Only you can take the final step to realizing that yes consciousness does exist, no matter how much sophistry some philosophers will engage in to try to deny it.
Do you disagree that the computer in my hypothetical example would have the intuitions it does about its own senses? Given that it does, how can you trust your own intuitions about your sensory qualia, no matter how strong?
Your example starts of by telling us that the computer is known not to have qualia, which I understand to mean that it does not have subjective conscious experiences. First I don't think its ever possible to know, even in principle, whether something other than one's own self has or does not have subjective experiences, but I'll ignore that objection for the moment.
A few lines later you say:
> We, and the computer, just know that we're seeing red.
Now much hinges on what is meant here by the verb "know". If you are using the word in a loose metaphorical sense then I could accept that. For example you could say that a computer "knows" that the word "red" means an RGB value of (255,0,0) because in its memory there is a hash table that maps some strings to RGB values. So behaviorally you can ask the computer what "red" means and it will tell you "(255,0,0)". But there is nothing in such a description that implies that the process of generating that output is associated with any kind of subjective experience on the part of the computer.
On the other hand when you "know" some simple fact the process of reporting that fact is always associated with some subjective experiences, specifically the experience of thinking. How do I know that ? Well technically I don't. All I really know is that whenever I know something and am asked to report on it the process is always accompanied by a subjective experience of thought. I am simply making the conventional assumption here that the same is true for all other humans and that you are a member of that group. Of course that assumption might be false. For all I know I could be having this conversation with LaMDA.
To get back to the questions you asked here:
> Do you disagree that the computer in my hypothetical example would have the intuitions it does about its own senses?
Yes, because you said it didn't have conscious experiences and for me the word "intuition" is strongly linked to certain conscious experiences.
> how can you trust your own intuitions about your sensory qualia, no matter how strong?
Because I have them. I am not a black box to myself, I get to look inside and when I do I find that there are conscious experiences there. That's just not something I can, even in principle, be mistaken about. However once I start making assumptions about the nature of those experiences, such as that there is some external physical world that is ultimately responsible for them, I am already on very shaky ground.
When I talk about "an intelligence," I mean a thing with an internal thought process which can reflect upon its own thought process in a non-trivial way. This excludes large language models like LaMDA which don't really have semantic thoughts, but it would certainly be possible for a true computer intelligence along these lines to exist which nonetheless didn't experience "actual qualia" (assuming qualia are real, existing things).
A stream of consciousness thought process has input---it can sense temperature, it can observe its own hair, it can read articles---and for the purposes of our model, we can suppose that this input is appended to its internal log similarly to how new thoughts are. This sensory input is abstract: A thought process may sense heat---i.e. sensory information about the external temperature may be entered into the thought process---but the thought process can't go on to make any real observations about that sensation. A thought process can't interpret sensory input as anything beyond simply "a distinct input of this or that type with a relative magnitude of whatever," because that input is abstract and irreducible. Further thoughts in the thought process will describe these sensory inputs as vivid, unique, and ineffable when they reflect upon them, but those properties only exist as a product of the relationship between the thought process and its input. The ineffable qualities of these senses as described by their thought process is not a real thing, but only an interpretation.
So when I hear the argument, "I can reflect on the way my senses feed into my thoughts, and by their apparent ineffable and transcendental nature, I can say they're self-evidently real things that exist outside of my own beliefs about them," I'm pretty skeptical. A computer intelligence with an internal thought process like I described above would reach those same conclusions simply by virtue of the relationship between its sensory input and its thoughts. We're not unbiased observers; our perspective as an intelligence breaks down when we try to reason about the nature of the abstract and atomic inputs which our thought process is based upon. Because of the way senses feed into thoughts, an intelligence can't help but find them ineffable and transcendental; therefore, when I find my own sensory information to be ineffable and transcendental, I can't take that at face value as anything more than an illusion of perspective.
> Because I have them. I am not a black box to myself, I get to look inside and when I do I find that there are conscious experiences there. That's just not something I can, even in principle, be mistaken about.
A computerized thought process can look at its own thoughts too, but there's no reason to suppose that it (and you) can't draw mistaken conclusions about them. For instance, the mistaken conclusion that the distinctness of one input or another must be a real existing quality and not just a logical axiom essential to the functioning of that thought process.
Let me start by making a distinction: When you take a bite of an apple, you experience a variety of flavours: It's sweet, tart, and has a distinct apple aroma as well. Let's hone in on the last of those. If you took apart an apple under a microscope and examined its flavour compounds, you could find what chemical causes you to experience the sensation of apple flavour, but you would not find apple flavour itself. Let's call the experience of eating an apple and feeling a taste that has its own quality about it which is unique and distinct from every other taste apparent qualia—the conviction that qualia exist and you're experiencing them. The apple flavour itself is an actual quale.
Suppose we build a smart computer, self-aware enough to hold a conversation about philosophy. And let us suppose that we can say for certain that this computer has no access to actual qualia, and we know because we've solved the hard problem of consciousness. Apple flavour is real, we know where to find it (in dimension X or whatever) and only human neurons can access it. This computer does have senses, though, and its senses are abstract. When we look at a stop sign, we don't know which of the millions of rods and cones are firing in our retinas, no more so does our computer know which pixels of its camera are sensing which wavelengths. We, and the computer, just know that we're seeing red. We deal in abstracts.
We put an apple into this computer's mechanical mouth. It chews, it tastes, and we ask it to describe the flavour. "It's sweet, it's tart, and it has a distinct apple aroma," it says. Very well, it doesn't need access to actual qualia to know this. Apples contain sugars, acids, and apple flavour compounds. The computer is just listing the names for the flavours which correspond to those chemicals.
"Computer," we ask, "tell us how you can tell that the apple is apple-flavoured."
"Well," it responds, "the chemical signals from my mouth, as interpreted by the digital plumbing of my mind, are telling me there's an apple flavour."
"Can you describe this flavour to us? Is it the same as strawberry flavour?"
"No, they're different flavours, but I can't really describe them to you. I can just tell they're different."
You take a small white pill and put it in the computer's mouth. "Oh, this is an apple-flavoured pill," it remarks.
"How can you tell it's apple-flavoured?" you ask.
"Well, the flavour is the same as the flavour of an apple."
"Can you describe that flavour?"
"No, it's indescribable. But it is distinct. That's why I can recognize it."
As we go on with our thought experiment, it becomes clear that this computer is experiencing apparent qualia. To the computer, all these flavours are unique and distinct and recognizable—they must be, in order for its senses to function. How can this happen, if it doesn't have access to actual qualia? Well, qualia are the basic building blocks of our senses. They are abstract: The flavour of an apple may be reducible to a set of other flavours, but those base flavour are atomic. You can't break down sweetness any further, or even really describe it at all; it simply is itself.
Any intelligent entity with senses will interpret those senses in terms of basic building blocks. Those basic blocks will be distinct and recognizable; in order to tell the difference between red and yellow, the colour red must exist in the mind in a way which is distinct from the colour yellow. Because these building blocks are atomic, that distinction is irreducible. It is very easy to look at these atomic abstractions and marvel at them, and it's intuitive to start asking questions like, "What is redness itself? What is the source of the actual quale which I am experiencing when I look at something red?", but we're jumping the gun there. Apparent qualia, the experience of unique and essential sensory building blocks, arises necessarily from self-aware examination of sensory input regardless of whether there are any actual qualia or not. If we must necessarily feel that "redness" exists in order for our senses to work, how can we ever be sure that this feeling reflects an actual "redness" and is not just a necessary illusion?
A final argument: We exist because natural selection tweaked the structure of some self-replicating acids over the course of billions of years until they were smart enough to examine the world around them and question their own perceptions of it. The consciousness we exhibit is not essential to this; the only goal of our design is reproduction. Even if you don't think a computer can feel actual qualia, a computer can certainly make decisions to optimize survival and reproduction, which is all we actually need to do. Why would evolution give us access to actual qualia when we don't need them? Why aren't we simply biological computers? As our thought experiment earlier suggests, however, a biological computer would feel as if it had access to actual qualia even if it didn't. Perhaps evolution could construct a complex qualia-sensing interface using science that humanity hasn't even conceived of yet, but it could also construct a simple biological computer that is convinced it feels actual qualia even though it doesn't. Both would work equally well. Even if actual qualia do exist, Occam's razor suggests we don't have access to them.