This is a thought experiment, there's no actual evidence that you can create an accurate digital model that is equivalent to an analog and biochemical brain. Just claiming that you can reduce biological organisms to computational processes does not make it so, it's just an idea that hackers find cool.
That either sentience or intelligence is just "numbers and algorithms" is conjecture with not much going for it. We as humans use numbers and algorithms (which are really figures of speech, not things), to explain physical reality, not the other way around.
The numbers and algorithms here aren’t what anybody is saying could be sentient. Those numbers and algorithms are representations used to coerce physical objects into doing computation. Processors don’t care about the algorithms you see on your computer screen. So then the questions are “can computation be sentient”, or “are sentient things sentient by way of computation”, and I think that’s much, much harder to answer.
A digital machine and an analog one aren't equivalent merely because their behaviour can both be explained in the same terms. (i.e. computationally). That's not to say by the way you can't make some kind of sentient digital system, just that computation isn't really relevant to answer that question.
There are mountains of evidence in favor of the Standard Model, which is computable. Therefore, there actually _is_ evidence that the human brain can be similarly computed. (Whether our technology can ever come near to this kind of power is where I have doubts). What there _isn't_ evidence for is that there is anything non-computable within the human brain.
Meaning that computability doesn't matter if there's inherently randomness at the smallest scales
> This, however, is premised on the notion that a simulation of a mental phenomenon is equivalent, in essence, to the phenomenon itself. There are many compelling arguments against this notion in philosophy of mind, the most well known of which is perhaps John Searle’s (2004). To gain some intuition about what these arguments generally entail, consider this: Do we have any reason to believe that, by performing a perfectly accurate simulation of kidney function in a computer, the computer will begin urinating on its desk? Clearly not. There is an essential difference between a computer simulation and the phenomenon it simulates; they are not the same thing, no matter how accurate the simulation. Yet, those hoping to “upload consciousness” under the physicalist narrative seem to become so engrossed in abstraction that they lose touch with basic intuitions of plausibility. Their neurosis is, in this sense, comparable with religious dogmatism.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/21582440166745...
1. If simulation of a mental phenomenon is not equivalent, in essence, to the phenomenon itself, then what's a meaningful difference between the two? What is this elusive essence of the phenomenon and why is it a requirement in any meaningful definition of intelligence, consciousness, sentience, etc? If we build a silicon brain some day that passes as human, does it matter that its essence is different from a carbon-based brain? 2. Searle's Chinese Room neglects to acknowledge that the room itself is what would be exhibiting intelligence, not the homonculus within. His argument fails by presuming without evidence that consciousness is not an emergent phenomenon. 3. Of course we don't expect the computer to urinate on the desk, just as we don't expect a silicon mind to produce serotonin. That's irrelevant to the question of whether or not it exhibits the qualities or behaviors that we associate with consciousness.
I guess I just don't understand why there needs to be this added, untestable, metaphysical requirement attached to all of these words. And my question to those who suggest this is, what would it convince you otherwise?
You can trivialise anything using this rhetoric, but that doesn't make it meaningful. Just think hard until you can move objects with your mind. If you still can't, think harder. The majority of things are more complicated than that [1], even if they are 'just numbers and algorithms' (also not proven). 'Doing more of the same' is not the only, best, or universally-applicable route to advancement.
We don't fully understand the brain, let alone consciousness itself. Throwing more and more compute at the problem without discernment is like trying to understand music by setting louder and louder alarms.
That only works if "move objects with your mind" is possible to do. "It's not possible to make a model of a human" is a possible objection to the argument, but it raises the question: "why not?". There seems to be no blocker beyond cost and lack of research.
I am as optimistic as they come, but let's look at much smaller problem: modeling an arbitrary analog circuit with DSP. The Nyquist theorem implies it's impossible to model such a circuit perfectly. Is there hope for perfectly modeling a physical brain with an electrical computer?
When you can ""Just"" do that we'll see I guess.
You'll miss out on a lot if you stop as soon as our engineering can't catch up to our imagination.
This is interesting, and I think you've reached the right conclusion, but the reasoning is flawed. It has to be flawed, because it can be used to prove that we're not sentient either.
Just create an arbitrarily accurate digital model of a human brain and step through time. Is it sentient? If not, make it more accurate until it is. If it is, where is the sentience? It's just numbers and algorithms, right?
You could argue that sentience just doesn't exist, which may be valid, but if it does, I don't think you can get very far with a reduction-to-parts analysis.