Re:MIT researchers uncover ‘unpatchable’ flaw in Apple M1 chips
by aaron_m04 on Saturday June 11, 2022 @09:30PM
(#31710383)
Would it be possible instead to mitigate this by removing the side-channel: either don't leave any trace in the TLB of the speculative execution, or deny access to the TLB for user mode software?
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Re:MIT researchers uncover ‘unpatchable’ flaw in Apple M1 chips
by jprx on Monday June 13, 2022 @11:30AM
(#31726974)
Unwinding changes to the TLB on every mispredict would have a significant overhead and hurt overall performance. Removing valid data you just cached (speculatively or otherwise) is generally a bad idea.
User mode software requires a TLB (unless you want to do a page walk for every single instruction!)
Even if you could remove the TLB entirely from the CPU somehow, the attacker could just use the cache or some other microarchitectural structure.