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Re:The implications of UEFI "Secure Boot" for Linux users by albertzeyer on Friday October 28, 2011 @12:36PM (#3168958)
Isn't it always possible to just fake that Remote Attestation request? Or I wonder, how would it be possible to implement that in a way that it is non-breakable security wise / cryptographically?
Re:The implications of UEFI "Secure Boot" for Linux users by a3_nm on Friday October 28, 2011 @02:28PM (#3169457)
If the private key is stored on the TPM chip, if the crypto takes place on the TPM chip, and if the remote service knows your public key (or, more likely, a master key which signed your key), then you won't be able to break the scheme by intercepting the request.

Of course, even though the general scheme might be sound, there might still be a lot of possible attacks. I'm not saying it's unbreakable.

Re:The implications of UEFI "Secure Boot" for Linux users by albertzeyer on Sunday October 30, 2011 @01:18PM (#3174827)
Ah ok. But probably it also wont take long until the private key from the TPM chips gets hacked.