Re:Show HN: Seal – Verifiable timestamp for your private ideas
by password4321 on Monday June 06, 2022 @10:33PM
(#31649239)
> if the signature and timestamp were fraudulently created
This is enough, independent of whether or not it happened after any of the certificates involved have expired. I don't think most consider total "key compromise" (of the 3rd party timestamping cert + the code signing cert) part of the threat model... but if there was an issue either could be revoked at a specific point in time. (Mentioning algorithm compromise takes away from your argument, when that happens entire segments of PKI get tossed.)
A user’s software can distinguish between code signed with an expired certificate that should not be trusted and code that was signed with a Certificate that was valid at the time the code was signed but which has subsequently expired.
This is enough, independent of whether or not it happened after any of the certificates involved have expired. I don't think most consider total "key compromise" (of the 3rd party timestamping cert + the code signing cert) part of the threat model... but if there was an issue either could be revoked at a specific point in time. (Mentioning algorithm compromise takes away from your argument, when that happens entire segments of PKI get tossed.)
https://knowledge.digicert.com/generalinformation/INFO1119.h...
A user’s software can distinguish between code signed with an expired certificate that should not be trusted and code that was signed with a Certificate that was valid at the time the code was signed but which has subsequently expired.