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Re:Apple Passkey by jupp0r on Monday June 06, 2022 @07:55PM (#31648107)
Only if by "never reuse" you mean "never ever log in after the initial login". The problem that WebAuthn/FIDO solves is that even if you read my encrypted communication, you won't be able to use it to gain access to my identity.
Re:Apple Passkey by raxxorraxor on Tuesday June 07, 2022 @03:26AM (#31650909)
A software implementation of WebAuthn requires a TPM module and to be honest I think privacy and user identification are more of a security problem on the web than being phished for passwords. The problem I see with Fido2 is that they consider a far too narrow corridor of threats.

Sure, for devices that need to authenticate themselves it is a decent or maybe the best solution. For me as a user? I am not convinced. It cannot compete with passwords.

Re:Apple Passkey by jjav on Tuesday June 07, 2022 @01:08AM (#31650106)
If you've managed to insert your malicious code in a place where you can bypass TLS, secrecy of the password isn't my main concern anymore, as all is lost. It's not a threat model I worry about in most circumstances (sure there's always exceptions).