Greece made quite the mess on its own, of course, but the number of ways in which the EU has further screwed the pooch are mind-blowing.
[..] the matter of how Greece was permitted to join the
Eurozone with, shall we say, overly optimistic economic
reports that were blindly accepted [..]
I think this is one of the fundamental things about this whole crisis (concerning Greece). everybody knew that the Greece governments were very creative with their way of presenting their financial situations back to the seventies (or even longer), and everybody knew it when the decision was made to let them join the euro.but nobody checked their balances, but only trusted the numbers the Greeks were serving and which everybody knew were kind of faked.
so in the end, the most ridiculous thing is that there never was a Plan B, or some kind of secret exit strategy. all the ones in charge of in the EU and its member states for more than a decade exactly knew that you can't trust the official numbers coming from the Greek peninsula, and nobody did a thing or thought of a plan to follow in the worst case scenario (which had to come one day)?
Edit: typo
I am not well versed enough in finance to speculate on who gains and how in these scenarios, but it seems like too much of a lock-in to be 'accident'. I know that in the past, nations and the IMF used loans and defaults to influence policies of other countries, could it be something like that going on here? Default as a way to force spending cuts and other political changes?
It means that they are replaced by other financial assets. Why do they now insist that those other financial assets are no longer liabilities of Greece, but liabilities of somebody else? Who the hell knows. As long as everything is financial, it's just a silly numbers game.
You really have to ask yourself the question: Why do you build up net financial assets in the first place? Ultimately, that only makes sense if, at some point in time, you plan to exchange them for real assets.
But Germany (myself excluded) is hell-bent on ever increasing net exports. If they follow this policy, it means that Germany will never exchange net financial assets for net real assets, but will in fact continue to do the reverse.
If Germany stopped insisting on being a net exporter, and started to become a net importer instead, they could use their financial claims towards Greece to import real goods and services from there, and increase their own real standard of living. Germany could be happy, Greece could be happy. But ideology and confusion stands in the way.
It really is Kafkaesque.
Because they think that the other party is more likely to live up to its obligations than Greece.
It's pretty clear that it's better to be owed $1 by the German govt than by the Greek govt. However, it is probably better to be owed $1 by the Greek govt than to be owed $0.10 by the German govt.
Somewhere between those points, there's an equilibrium.
This rollover game could continue indefinitely. That's my whole point. It would only have to stop if, at some point, Germany decides that it wants to become a net importer, which is equivalent to running down net financial claims against other countries. Then at some point they would want to reduce the amount of financial claims against Greece, and Greece would have to cancel their liabilities, ostensibly by sending real goods to Germany. The point is, however, that the German elite is totally hell-bent on staying a net exporting country forever.
Of course, this is not what happens, because micro economics is different from macro economics. The micro actors behave like you explain, and their behavior is perfectly reasonable from their individual point of view (well, except that it is totally unreasonable for non-capitalist Germans to be in favor of net exports, but they have no say in the matter at the moment). However, on the macro level, this creates behavior that is quite literally schizophrenic.
That goal doesn't imply that it's reasonable for them to simply "give away" the value of that surplus, let alone for them to give away in excess of that surplus for any period of time. The latter is important because some of the bailout proposals have germany giving up multiple years of export surplus.
In addition, some of the proposals seem to be both giving up on Greek debts owed to Germany (and/or German banks) and taking on debts owed to others.
Note that the surplus does give Germany some power, so it isn't just bits on a disk.
> So long as Germany and Greece both accept the game, their will never be any problem of insolvency.
Another problem is that admiting to that game is (for Germany) admitting to being a sucker. While Germany may, in fact, be a sucker, admitting it is a very different thing.
- what about -
"pay for the massacres back in the 40's"
?
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_massacres_in_Greece]
And it's more like loaning so that the Greeks may afford to buy their high quality products.
Or do I have this wrong? I've been trying to follow this a bit..