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Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by jackpirate on Thursday May 19, 2022 @01:28PM (#31437590)
My work brings me into regular contact with DPRK IT professionals, for example by [teaching open source sotware](https://izbicki.me/blog/teaching-open-source-in-north-korea....) or [teaching proper web design](https://izbicki.me/blog/fixing-north-korea-kcna-webpage.html). I make a lot of effort to respect sanctions, but documents like this are incredibly unhelpful. I've read through the document, and it seems completely devoid of actionable, DPRK-specific information that can help IT professionals avoid sanctions violations. For example, the document encourages websites to monitor for the following activity as "indications of DPRK IT workers who may be using their platforms":

• Multiple logins into one account from various IP addresses in a relatively short period of time, especially if the IP addresses are associated with different countries;

• Developers are logging into multiple accounts on the same platform from one IP address;

• Developers are logged into their accounts continuously for one or more days at a time;

• Router port or other technical configurations associated with use of remote desktop sharing software, such as port 3389 in the router used to access the account, particularly if usage of remote desktop sharing software is not standard company practice;

• Developer accounts use a fraudulent client account to increase developer account ratings, but both the client and developer accounts use the same PayPal account to transfer/withdraw money (paying themselves with their own money);

• Frequent use of document templates for things such as bidding documents and project communication methods, especially the same templates being used across different developer accounts;

• Multiple developer accounts receiving high ratings from one client account in a short period, with similar or identical documentation used to establish the developer accounts and/or the client account;

• Extensive bidding on projects, and a low number of accepted project bids compared to the number of projects bids on by a developer; and

• Frequent transfers of money through payment platforms, especially to PRC-based bank accounts, and sometimes routed through one or more companies to disguise the ultimate destination of the funds.

This list is so generic that I'm not sure what the point of it is. I think it would make sense to ban some of these practices from a general security perspective. But these practices would give way too many false positives if you were trying to use them to identify DPRK developers.

I'm honestly really confused about who the target audience is for publications like this. It can't be actual IT professionals due to the lack of actionable information. Is it journalists? Do we publish these things just to remind them that we don't like the DPRK?

Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by mcculley on Thursday May 19, 2022 @01:53PM (#31437914)
The simplest first thing that U.S. companies should do is implement E-Verify and require that all subcontractors do the same. This publication does not even mention E-Verify.
Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by cschmid on Thursday May 19, 2022 @02:09PM (#31438113)
That would only help you if they claim to be US-based in the first place. They do mention background checks, there are some companies offering those internationally.
Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by mcculley on Thursday May 19, 2022 @02:15PM (#31438164)
They mention forged social security cards. The government has a system for verifying them, E-Verify, provided for free to employers.
Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by imroot on Thursday May 19, 2022 @10:36PM (#31442728)
I tried to help a family member set up E-Verify for her small manufacturing company in 2019, and the government would not approve her business for E-Verify, even though they had been established for 50 years and had almost 200 employees on the payroll.

They ran just about everything in-house (including payroll) and because they didn't use a PEO, the government didn't want to deal with them, and they had to get someone in Congress to intervene on their behalf before getting the approval.

Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by mcculley on Friday May 20, 2022 @06:11AM (#31445395)
I have implemented it for two businesses, a software consultancy with 32 employees at the time and a tugboat company with 50 employees at the time. It was tedious, but we had no real obstacles.
Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by daniel-cussen on Thursday May 19, 2022 @11:22PM (#31442999)
Why would an employer get to see my social security card? Not just the number, which is a "fuck the law" thing by this point, but the actual card? Might as well ask the dimensions of my intestines.

[Flashback May 19 23:19: someone did once check out my organs that way! A brain scan I only found out about because I was asked to participate in a class action suit against Aetna for not paying! Thanks for not paying, Aetna! You know I didn't sign on to that suit against you, that's why I didn't! Otherwise it would have been like picking up money off the street, which I have done, and it was easy, but I didn't see it that way because of the immorality of suing you! They were committing malpractice to harm me, spying on me with a brain scan! I sincerely thank you for not covering that claim, only thing that limited my time in the torture ward. I would be in there to this day if you paid and kept paying those fraudulent claims.]

Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by notch656a on Thursday May 19, 2022 @01:58PM (#31437988)
Federal agencies regularly and deliberately issue vague guidance. It's designed to scare the maximum number of people from doing anything for fear that whatever they're doing will be construed as illegal. It would be less effective if they actually articulated in a specific actionable manner. Arbitrary and capricious is the name of the game.
Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by 8organicbits on Thursday May 19, 2022 @05:18PM (#31440289)
> I make a lot of effort to respect sanctions

Are there certain things you aren't able to teach when you travel, or is that fairly unrestricted? I had no idea people were doing work like this.

Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by A4ET8a8uTh0 on Thursday May 19, 2022 @06:29PM (#31440992)
It does not take much to run afoul of sanctions on a country that has total embargo status. Even normally legal counsel advice may be prohibited to US persons to provide ( sorry for odd syntax ). In other words, OP does not have to deal with anything beyond normal IT work and still could be restricted on what information he can provide.

Not to search too far, although that is a more exotic example, recently crypto guy got smacked for providing crypto speech ( classified as technical advice ) to DPRK(1).

(1)https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-citizen-who-conspired-assi...

Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by drc500free on Thursday May 19, 2022 @10:47PM (#31442792)
Do you have an example where the defendant didn't specifically and purposefully provide guidance on how to use tech to circumvent sanctions? It's not like he was generically talking about crypto.
Re:State Dept Guidance on DPRK IT Workers [pdf] by newguynewphone on Friday May 20, 2022 @04:33PM (#31452179)
I mean, we would have to see all sides of information, but this is not normal IT work.

On another note, would this case be directly related to the 400 million hack north korea did?