>I dont remember anybody foreseeing that. Zero. Not one analyst. Ive only heard retrospective justifications for why it happened which any idiot can come up with.

It makes sense (in retrospect; I am certainly not an analyst who predicted this beforehand).

Right now, it is more or less impossible for any Russian to a) use the dollar to buy anything from outside Russia, and b) travel outside Russia to buy anything in the first place. That greatly reduces the demand for exchanging rubles for dollars, whether via official or unofficial means.

Consider Argentina, a country that for years has had its own serious economic issues. A huge skew between the official and black-market exchange rate for hard currency, such as in Argentina (the "dolar azul"), exists because a) there are capital controls but b) it's still possible to use those dollars/Euro/Swiss franc/whatever. Argentineans are free to use the US dollar to buy things, both inside and outside Argentina. This doesn't apply to Russians.

You wrote elsewhere:

>Im also really skeptical of the position that its an irrelevant economic indicator only when it goes in the opposite direction you expect it to. Everybody was saying the exact opposite when the ruble was plunging.

Agreed. It seems like Western analysts were completely wrong on both Russia's military strength versus Ukraine's, and the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy.

Most countries choose to have two out of three things for a currency (having all three is impossible):

1. Control over the value 2. Control over inflation 3. Free trade

Russia has chosen to just go for one of the trifecta, and have lost all trade and has skyrocketing inflation - but manages to keep the ruble trading high for propaganda purposes as it's seen as the "quick way to measure" an economy.

This contradicts what Ive heard from inside the country which is that inflation spiked sharply to ~40% and then prices came down (now 15% up on prewar levels).

So, inflation is a bit higher than in the west but it is not runaway for us or them...yet.

It appears more as if this is due to the balance of payments. Imports are down due to sanctions while exports of gas/oil by value are up. Hence higher ruble.

Ruble is a weak indicator as the central bank has tools to control the exchange rate. Soviet ruble also had a strong and, for a long time, quite stable exchange rate with the US dollar. However, in Soviet Union you could not legally own foreign currency (nor you could buy Western goods and services). The exchange rate by no means indicated the economic situation in the USSR.

Weak or not it is an indicator and it is indicative of economic muscle - economic muscle we are frequently told Russia is supposed to have lost as a result of this war.

This indicator shot up in the exact opposite direction all western commentators said it would.

Id be interested in economic commentary by anybody who predicted this or even said it was a possibility but Im profoundly disinterested in economic commentary from people who were completely blindsided by it and are now scrambling to offer posthoc rationalizations. These are not thinkers they are sheep.

Im also really skeptical of the position that its an irrelevant economic indicator only when it goes in the opposite direction you expect it to. Everybody was saying the exact opposite when the ruble was plunging.

I think the debate boils down to

The other side: The ruble is up. This is indeed strange, and no one really foresaw this result. Explanations range from Putin has chosen to prop it up at the expense of other indicators to gaz trades are still high, and availability on foreign markets of rubles has dropped sharply.

Your side: Putin has shown economic muscle that no one expected he would have. There are definitely eggs on the face of the western analysts.

I don't see how both points are incompatible.