The mover only has as much power from the body moving it, so it would still be distributed - almost like a top-down message passing or request if needing more power to allocate the infinite.

> Leibniz uses "original capacity" here to distinguish primary from secondary causation, noting that "secondary causes operate by virtue of the primary". I take this to mean that if a mover is being moved by something else, its power is only by virtue of the thing moving it, rather than an original capacity. I therefore require that the mover not be moved itself, for the conclusion of this premise to apply.

I find this quite elegant actually. It's like an allowance of energy in a fractal pattern. Feels elegant!

> But if B is moved by another body, which in turn is moved by another body, and so on, then we face either an infinite regress or a cycle, with each body moving the next. To handle this, Leibniz invokes p4, taking together all bodies which are movers, and referring to the whole as C.

So the argument hinges on the composition of (all) moving objects and the premise that the composed body is also moving but cannot be moved by another body since all the bodies are in the composition.

Supposing the only objects in the universe are two objects moving each other (in a cycle), they are considered a single body moved by an immaterial body because their composition cannot move itself? So everything boils down to where does energy come from?

I think other bodies can move other bodies depending on how much energy it uses relative to its motion in that sense of the proof.

Think of it as a budget of initial size.

So the bodies are limited as a whole vs the incorporeal which is infinite and influences the bodies total energy distribution per allowance.

I think the distinction lies in God being that which cannot be moved, having infinite power is not enough to be God.

I think the post is more about what Oak can do as a proof language. Obviously, anyone can pick apart the argument.