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Re:Open DNS resolvers, from bad to worse by sph on Friday May 13, 2022 @07:01PM (#31373435)
> In my own protocols, I always made sure that the sender has to put in more bytes until a >2^64-bit secret was echoed.

I have a hard time parsing this statement. What do you mean?

Re:Open DNS resolvers, from bad to worse by Aachen on Friday May 13, 2022 @07:16PM (#31373525)
Yeah I packed a lot into there, sorry. What I meant is that the client initially has to send more data into the connection than the server returns. That means sending some padding data in the client hello packet. This rule is only broken after the client echoed an unguessable random token, which has a similar effect to doing a TCP handshake (because a spoofed-source client wouldn't be able to echo this value), so I know they're legit and I can safely send big answers to small requests without the risk of DoS'ing an innocent third party. It also prevents a third party from trigger the rate limiting and thus blocking an innocent third party's access.