Less mining power does roughly correlate to an easier attack on the network, but this is mostly independent of the technical decisions made by a given blockchain (there is some impact if e.g. the work function is sufficiently different that hardware from a larger network cannot be repurposed to mount an attack on a smaller network, e.g. using scrypt means bitcoin ASICs cannot mine on the network, making an attack much less easy to carry out. Ethereum's work function is designed to be memory bandwidth instead of compute limited, making GPUs generally optimal, and monero uses a funky algorithm designed to run best on general purpose CPUs).
I will also note (and this is a point I don't see made often), that there is not really a specific mechanism in most blockchains to set the total mining rewards (and thus the total amount of effort mining which is incentivised) to an optimal value. It might be entirely excessive, in which case the network is secure but even more inefficient, or it might be insufficient, there is nothing which really sets this to a particular value. This is in part because it's hard to know exactly what level of mining is necessary (what's the difficulty required to fend off all attackers? probably depends on what they could gain from an attack, which is hard to assess), and because it depends on the price of the coin, which is something the network does not really have a means to assess within itself. (This is one of the reasons why I think bitcoin as a "long term store of value" does not make sense. The deflationary design requires ever-diminishing mining rewards, but the network will still require significant mining effort to secure it, especially if the amount of value stored keeps going up. In the 'bitcoin as currency' model, the transaction fees would keep the incentive present, but with a relatively low rate of transactions you will need extremely high transaction fees to secure the network, making it potentially quite an expensive store of value to maintain.
Agreed - it stands to reason that as BTCUSD rises, more miners will come in until the electricity and electronics wasted per day reaches a certain, relatively fixed proportion of the daily block rewards (900 BTC/d until 2024, currently about USD 35m per day). With that, BTC now consumes about 0.5% of world electricity. If BTC goes 10x, its electricity consumption could approach 5% of world electricity consumption - insanity.
Bitcoin could very well be simultanously ridiculously inefficient and yet have insufficient incentive to keep mining at a secure level long-term.
1. Isn't scrypt a key-derivation-function, and thus (by design) much slower and more work intensive than SHA-256 (a cryptographic hash)??
2. Isn't anyway difficulty adjusted depending on the available hash power (such that a target block rate is reached), so that "faster and easier to run than SHA256" does not make any sense at all?
Have the authors even understood PoW?