https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation...
However ECB is a lot worse than "you can see data patterns"--with a chosen plaintext attack (very common scenario in networking and storage applications) any dumbass can decrypt it trivially.
No you can’t get decryption key using chosen plaintext attack with AES.
Read here: https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/1512/why-is-aes-r...
This is what the talk is called because that is what the vendor advertised not because it is a standardized thing which makes sense.
Actually the vendor does a lot of not so grate things, from a very very bad password hashing to how they handled file encryption.
Interesting is that the talk about the security ends at 32min, after this is a talk from a private contractor hired by the the company which messed up the encryption. Still watching it but that's unusual and nice.
Symmetric key sizes larger than 256 bits are pretty much universally snake oil.
512, actually - some symmetric applications are vulnerable to collision or collision-like attacks, and a cosmological-scale attacker can theoretically get up to about 2^308[0] bit operations at current-ish cosmic microwave background temperatures, so 2^256 bit operations is just about plausible in worst case scenario planning.
But 256-bit keys are probably sufficient for any practical application, and that doesn't excuse 1024 anyway.
0:
You have: log2(1e80 amu c2 / k 3K ln(2))
# (mass of observable universe / landauer limit)
Definition: 307.995421024 is marketing fluff, which they justified by running 8 passes on the file encryption key (to paraphrase the presentation - ‘Regular consumers don’t understand encryption standards, but think bigger numbers = better and trust the term Military Grade’).
I'm reminded of the comments of chemistry experts about the UK government using the phrase "military-grade nerve agent"[0]. Firstly, no military would ever admit to owning the stuff (since even the permanent members of the UN security council are signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention), but, more obviously, there's no such thing as a civilian-grade nerve agent.
I suppose what they meant was "no medical, industrial, or commercial uses", or "requires the resources of an entire country to create and manage", but those aren't attributes that you would want for your security software.
[0] The Financial Times, 2018 - https://archive.ph/0eZl8
Paraoxon? Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane? Bifenthrin?
Depends who you are - If you are in marketing, it's a really helpful qualifier (i.e. it's something that the general public clearly put stock in, as mentioned in the presentation).
It's not a 100% guarantee that it's proprietary junk, but it's a very good indicator.
It uses the sector number and block offset within the sector as input, a little like a counter mode. Its major advantage is zero overhead, so you don't lose disk capacity, or need to map blocks around, you can just sorta use it as a filter layer in your disk reads/writes.
It's not properly authenticated though, as data tampering can result in altered or scrambled plaintext rather than detectable errors, so you need other mechanisms for error detection, which then have to be secure against attacks.
Note that AES is always used in a "mode of operation" to provide any sort of secure encryption. AE-secure modes are AES-SIV, AES-GCM-SIV, AES-OCB, and AES-GCM in decreasing order of safety/performance (possibly others, but those are the most well reviewed and most used). Those sometimes get noted with the key length, eg AES-256-GCM-SIV, sometimes not.